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DOES CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE MATTER? CANADA'S
RECOGNITION OF ABORIGINAL TITLE
By Kirsten Matoy Carlson*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1997, the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en hereditary chiefs' land claims
against the Canadian government reached the Canadian Supreme Court in
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia.! Each chief, acting on behalf of himself and his
people, asserted that their historical use of the lands demonstrated ownership and
claimed jurisdiction over 58,000 square kilometers of land. British Columbia
counterclaimed, arguing that the chiefs had no interest in the land or, alternatively,
that they only had a claim for monetary compensation against the Canadian
government. The Canadian Supreme Court had to sift through a long historical
record to decide whether the tribes' First Nations' claims to Aboriginal title were
cognizable.2
Aboriginal title claims like Delgamuukw are not new, rare, or isolated.
Since the arrival of British settlers, the British Crown has struggled with how to
deal with disputes over land ownership.' While the Crown instituted several
policies to address these land title disputes, many remained unresolved and were
inherited by the Canadian government upon Confederation in 1867. Like the
British Crown, the Canadian government has enacted various laws and policies to
address land rights issues, and even proscribed the discussion of Aboriginal land
* Ph.D. candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan. B.A.,
Johns Hopkins University (1997); M.A., Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand
(Fulbright Scholar) (1999); J.D., University of Michigan (2003). I extend special thanks to
faculty colloquia at the University of Minnesota and the University of Nebraska Law
Schools; participants at the 2005 Law & Society Annual Meeting; John Borrows, Charles
Epp, Sidney Harring, James Sakej Youngblood Henderson, and Don Herzog for reading
earlier drafts of this article; Suzanne Thorp, Kathryn Ballantine, and John Moon for their
research assistance; and Dwayne W. Jarman.
1. [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010.
2. Ultimately, the Court did not decide the merits of the case. Instead, it remanded
the case for a new trial because the original complaint described the claims as individual
rather than communal and the pleadings were never properly amended. Id. at 1063.
3. See, e.g., SIDNEY L. HARRING, WHITE MAN'S LAW: NATIVE PEOPLE IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY CANADIAN JURISPRUDENCE 35-36 (1998).
4. Id. at 35-41.
450 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law Vol. 22, No. 3
claims between 1927 and 1951. 5 Despite these policies, Aboriginal land claims
continue' and to this day, Aboriginal peoples seek to have their land rights
adjudicated in and affirmed by Canadian courts.7
A new twist in the contestation over land title and rights developed in
1982, when Canada overhauled its Constitution and added a new section
recognizing the distinct status and rights of Aboriginal peoples. Section 35(1) of
the Constitution Act, 1982 states, "The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the
aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed."8  While
section 35 recognizes and affirms existing Aboriginal and treaty rights, it does not
define these rights or the extent of their constitutional protection. 9 Nor does it
include any language indicating whether the rights are judicially enforceable.
This textual indeterminacy raises the question: What difference does the
constitutional recognition of Aboriginal rights make to the litigation of Aboriginal
title claims?
Constitutional law scholars have long tried to evaluate the actual impacts
of constitutional provisions.' °  They have continually debated whether
constitutional provisions matter, what they actually do, and whether changes in
constitutional norms are attributable to them." While most scholars agree that
5. THE REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES 296 (1996).
6. These tensions not only continue, but occasionally erupt, as they did in 1990
when the town of Oka announced its intention to expand a golf course into an area claimed
by local Iroquois. The Iroquois responded by barricading the location and a crisis ensued.
For a detailed history of the Oka Crisis, see OLIVE PATRICIA DICKASON, CANADA'S FIRST
NATIONS: A HISTORY OF FOUNDING PEOPLES FROM EARLIEST TIMES 326-30 (3d ed. 2002).
7. See, e.g., Gitxsan Houses v. British Columbia, [2003] 10 B.C.L.R.4th 126;
Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada, [2001] 51 O.R.3d 641; Haida Nation v. British
Columbia, No. SC3394, 101 A.C.W.S. (3d) 659 (B.C.S.C. Nov. 21, 2000), available at
2000 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 55017, rev'd, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511; Westbank First Nation v.
British Columbia, [2001] 191 D.L.R.4th 180 (B.C.); Chemainus First Nation v. British
Columbia Assets & Land Corp., No. 983940, 88 A.C.W.S. (3d) 520 (B.C.S.C. Jan. 7,
1999), available at 1999 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 48116.
8. Constitution Act, 1982, Canada Act, 1982, sched. B, pt. II, § 35(1) (U.K.), as
reprinted in R.S.C., No. 44 (Appendix 1985).
9. Id. § 35. Ardith Walkem notes the uncertainty surrounding section 35 when it
was adopted. Ardith Walkem, Constructing the Constitutional Box: The Supreme Court's
Section 35(1) Reasoning, in Box OF TREASURES OR EMPTY Box? TWENTY YEARS OF
SECTION 35, at 195, 196-97 (Ardith Walkem & Halie Bruce eds., 2003).
10. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS Do 4-6
(2001); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REv.
877, 877-79 (1996) [hereinafter Strauss, Common Law]; JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN
WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE,
CHARACTER AND COMMUNITY 231-33 (1985).
11. See, e.g., Charles R. Epp, Do Bills of Rights Matter? The Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, 90 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 765 (1996) [hereinafter Epp, Do Bills of
Rights Matter?].
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Does Constitutional Change Matter?
constitutions matter at least symbolically as foundational national documents, 1
some identify constitutions as potential focal devices that can be used to define
common ways of interacting,1 3 while others question whether written constitutions
are useful at all.'4 Some skeptics contend that courts interpret constitutional texts
to implement the common law rather than to revise the common law. 5 Others
doubt that constitution-makers can bind later generations to act, or not act as the
case may be, in a specified manner.' 6 They reject precommitment theories of
constitutionalism, which suggest that constitutional provisions are enacted to
remove topics from political agendas by constraining the decisions future
generations can make about them. 7 Recently, at least one scholar has suggested
that constitutions may even "entrench barriers to commitment."'
8
The richness of these debates emerges in dialogues in the United States
over whether constitutional amendments play a significant role in the development
of constitutional norms. 9 Arguably, the most famous of these discussions
revolves around the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. While
these amendments have had tremendous symbolic importance from their adoption,
whether they had any actual impact on constitutional decision-making or norms
during the first 100 years of their existence is often questioned.'0 David Strauss,
for example, argues that "these amendments changed things much less than one
might think" because none of them were principal means of constitutional change
12. WHITE, supra note 10, at 231.
13. Russell Hardin, Why a Constitution?, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE NEW
INSTITUTIONALISM 100, 100-0 1 (Bernard Grofman & David Wettman eds., 1987).
14. See Strauss, Common Law, supra note 10, at 877.
15. See id. at 882.
16. See generally Jon Elster, Don't Burn Your Bridge Before You Come to It: Some
Ambiguities and Complexities of Precommitment, 81 TEx. L. REv. 1751, 1758-59 (2003);
Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of
Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. EcON. HIST.
803, 803 (1989).
17. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. Cn. L. REv. 633, 639
(1991); John Ferejohn & Lawrence Sager, Commitment and Constitutionalism, 81 TEx. L.
REv. 1929, 1929-31 (2003).
18. David S. Law, The Paradox of Omnipotence: Courts, Constitutions, and
Commitments, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 06-16, at 5 (May
2005) (on file with author) (emphasis in original omitted).
19. See generally David A. Strauss, The irrevelance of Constitutional Amendments,
114 HARv. L. REv. 1457 (2001) [hereinafter Strauss, Irrelevance]; Reva B. Siegel, Text in
Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 297 (2001); Adrian Vermuele, Constitutional Amendments and the Constitutional
Common Law (Chicago Law School Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper
No. 73, 2004), available at http://ssm.con/abstractid=590341.
20. See, e.g., Strauss, Irrelevance, supra note 19, at 1478-86.
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at the time of their adoption.2' Other scholars dispute Strauss's claims, suggesting
that he undervalues or ignores the multiple roles that amendments play in our
constitutional system.2 They point to the great symbolic value of the Thirteenth
Amendment, which was seen by its contemporaries as the transforming act ending
slavery and the original Constitution's compact with the devil by sanctioning
slavery, as evidence of Strauss's limited view.23 The Fourteenth Amendment,
Denning and Vile contend, not only overturned "the infamous Dred Scott decision
of 1857 and notorious three-fifths compromise," but also enabled civil rights
advocates "to point to a portion of the text of the Constitution - the fundamental
",24law of the land - that guaranteed equality of persons ....
The question of whether constitutional provisions matter is of increased
significance in an era of renewed constitution-making around the world. 25 This
article contributes to the debate over whether constitutions matter by taking a
specific case of constitutional change and empirically studying its impacts.
This article makes the strong claim that constitutional provisions do not
matter and evaluates it. It adds to the debate over the importance of constitutional
change by demonstrating that constitutional provisions, and more specifically, the
constitutional recognition of rights, have an actual impact in at least one particular
case. When considered in relation to other case studies of constitutional change, it
contributes to a larger scholarly project of determining whether, when, and how
constitutions matter.
This article focuses on the actual effects of the constitutional recognition
of Aboriginal rights on Aboriginal title litigation because countries are
increasingly considering or adopting these provisions." In the past twenty-five
21. Id. at 1479 ("The amendments made relatively little difference when they were
adopted."). Strauss describes the Thirteenth Amendment as merely hastening "the end of
slavery in a few border states by a few years," id. at 1480-81, the Fourteenth as
unnecessary, id. at 1484, and the Fifteenth as "added to the Constitution's text but [it] did
not become part of the Constitution in operation." Id. at 1483. He also asserts that the
influence of the Fourteenth Amendment during the civil rights revolution in the 1950s was
limited and not without qualification. Id. at 1484-85.
22. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning & John R. Vile, The Relevance of Constitutional
Amendments: A Response to David Strauss, 77 TUL. L. REV. 247, 251 (2002); MICHAEL
VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, AND THE
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 6 (2001).
23. Denning & Vile, supra note 22, at 259-61; VORENBERG, supra note 22, at 6.
24. Denning & Vile, supra note 22, at 260.
25. See, e.g., CLETUS GREGOR BARit, PUEBLOS INDiGENAS Y DERECHOS
CONSTITUCIONALES EN AMERICA LATINA: UN PANORAMA 474 (2000); DONNA LEE VAN COrr,
THE FRIENDLY LIQUIDATION OF THE PAST: THE POLITICS OF DIVERSITY IN LATIN AMERICA
257-60 (2000). See generally RICHARD SPITZ & MATTHEW CHASKALSON, THE POLITICS OF
TRANSITION: A HIDDEN HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA'S NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT (2000).
26. VAN CoTr, supra note 25, at 1-4. Indian rights advocates and legal scholars in the
United States have also proposed constitutional amendment as a way to resolve conflicts
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years, several countries have adopted constitutional provisions recognizing
Aboriginal rights.27 Many praised these constitutional changes as beneficial to the
legal recognition and protection of Aboriginal rights.28 They predicted that the
constitutional recognition of Aboriginal rights would alter the second-class
citizenship status of Aboriginal peoples, who have long been dispossessed of their
land, discriminated against, and impoverished.29
Despite this initial praise, some scholars are beginning to doubt whether
the constitutional recognition of Aboriginal rights always benefits Aboriginal
peoples and increases cultural tolerance within the state.3" Largely, these scholars
doubt the state's ability to pre-commit to the protection of Aboriginal rights.
Some suggest that the political expediency of recognizing Aboriginal rights may
be limited because the recognition of Aboriginal rights may be politically
advantageous at the time of constitution-making, but dangerous to political elites
in the long run, many of whom cite ambiguities in the text to justify inaction
later.31 Similarly, some political elites may have never intended for constitutional
between Indian Nations, states, and the federal government. See, e.g., WINONA LADuKE,
ALL OUR RELATIONS: NATIVE STRUGGLES FOR LAND AND LIFE 198-200 (1999); Frank
Pommersheim, Is There a (Little or Not so Little) Constitutional Crisis Developing in
Indian Law?: A Brief Essay, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 271, 285-86 (2002).
27. VAN CoTr, supra note 25, at 1-4, 266-68 tbl.4 (noting that Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru have all recently constitutionally protected
Aboriginal rights).
28. See, e.g., Arthur Manuel, Aboriginal Rights on the Ground: Making Section 35
Meaningful, in Box OF TREASURES OR EMPTY Box? TWENTY YEARS OF SECTION 35, at 316-
17 (Ardith Walkem & Halie Bruce eds., 2003) (expressing the author's initial high hopes
for the constitutional protection of Aboriginal rights); PATRICK MACKLEM, INDIGENOUS
DIFFERENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA 5 (2001).
29. VAN CoTr, supra note 25, at 1-4. Institute of Latin American Studies,
MULTICULTURALISM IN LATIN AMERICA: INDIGENOUS RIGHTS, DIVERSITY AND DEMOCRACY
4-5 (Rachel Sieder ed., 2002) [hereinafter MULTICULTURALISM IN LATIN AMERICA].
Additionally, some scholars suggested that the entire state, not just Aboriginal peoples, will
benefit from the recognition of Aboriginal rights because such constitutional rights promote
multiculturalism and more inclusive national political communities. See VAN COTT, supra
note 25, at 1-4; MULTICULTURALISM IN LATIN AMERICA, supra, at 4-5; Will Kymlicka, Three
Forms of Group-Differentiated Citizenship in Canada, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE:
CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 153 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996).
30. See, e.g., MULTICULTURALISM IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 29, at 11; ALAN C.
CAIRNS, CITIZENS PLUS: ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND THE CANADIAN STATE (2000); John
Borrows, Frozen Rights in Canada: Constitutional Interpretation and the Trickster, 22 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 37, 37-41 (1997) [hereinafter Borrows, Frozen Rights]; THE QUEST FOR
JUSTICE: ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND ABORIGINAL RIGHTS (Menno Boldt & J. Anthony Long
eds., 1985) [hereinafter THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE].
31. MULTICULTURALISM IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 29, at 11.
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recognitions of Aboriginal rights to be implemented or enforced. Other scholars
indicate that institutional concerns may undermine the impact of recognized
Aboriginal rights.32 The political elites acting for the state in adopting the
constitutional provisions may not be the same actors charged with enforcing the
Constitution.33 Thus, constitutional recognitions may be ignored by the state
actors expected to enforce them.34
The debate over the effects of the constitutional incorporation of
Aboriginal rights extends beyond Canada to other states that have adopted
constitutional provisions recognizing Aboriginal rights.33  These provisions
constitutionalize collective group rights based on claims to self-determination that
remain controversial even within the expansive international human rights
regime. 3' Recognition of these rights challenges historical notions of unified state
sovereignty and political communities based on nationalism. 37 They introduce
new concepts such as the idea of multinationalism within a single constitutional
state.38 While some may suggest that the recognition of collective group rights is
inconsistent with the idea of a liberal democracy,39 such arguments conceal the
complex relationship between collective group and individual rights within a
constitutional system.4  As Aboriginal rights are some of the first autonomy-
based collective group rights ever incorporated into constitutions, the impacts of
these rights are often debated.
While many of the debates over the impact of constitutional change
appear to make quasi-empirical claims, few empirical studies have been
conducted to determine whether constitutional provisions have any practical
effects.4 Scholars have conducted legal impact studies to analyze the effect of
32. Borrows, Frozen Rights, supra note 30, at 37-41.
33. MULTICULTURALISM IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 29, at 9-11.
34. David Strauss discusses the problems of rights enforcement in detail in arguing
that constitutional amendments and texts do not lead to legal change. Strauss, Common
Law, supra note 10, at 901-06; see also Strauss, Irrelevance, supra note 19, at 1457-69.
35. See VAN CoTT, supra note 25, at 266-68 tbl.4, 269.
36. See PATRICK THORNBERRY, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1-10
(2002).
37. Kymlicka, supra note 29, at 153; Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in
MULTICULTURALISM AND THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25, 51-61 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1994) [hereinafter Taylor, Politics].
38. Kymlicka, supra note 29, at 153; Taylor, Politics, supra note 37, at 51-61.
39. TOM FLANAGAN, FIRST NATIONS? SECOND THOUGHTS 194 (2000). Flanagan
argues that Aboriginal tights are inconsistent with liberal democracy because they make
race "the constitutive factor of the political order." Id.
40. See Jirgen Habermas, Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional
State (Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans.), in MULTICULTURALISM AND THE POLITICS OF
RECOGNITION 107, 107 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994).
41. While few empirical studies have been done, several descriptive and normative
works have been written on the subject of Aboriginal rights. See, e.g., Borrows, Frozen
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individual criminal rights, such as the impact of the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona,42 but these studies focus on constitutional
decision-making by a Supreme Court rather than the incorporation of a new
constitutional provision.43 Others have looked at whether the incorporation of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has altered the Canadian Supreme
Court's agenda-setting practices," but very few studies have attempted to
determine the impact of autonomy-based collective rights. In the specific context
of constitutional recognitions of Aboriginal rights, political scientist Donna Lee
Van Cott conducted a preliminary analysis of the implementation of constitutional
recognitions of Aboriginal rights in Colombia and Bolivia.45 Her work, however,
focused more on governmental implementation of these rights through legislation
than the use of litigation to enforce Aboriginal rights.' Similarly Yrigoyen
Fajardo analyzed the protection of Aboriginal juridical autonomy in Peruvian
courts under the 1993 Peruvian Constitution.47 Yrigoyen Fajardo's work looked at
the legal implementation of constitutional protections of Aboriginal rights by
Peruvian courts; it did not address whether constitutional reforms have affected
the number and kinds of claims being made by Aboriginal peoples.4 s
This study builds upon these few existing empirical works by looking at
the multidimensional aspects of the impact of constitutional change. This article
discusses the potential impacts of constitutional change on both courts and
Aboriginal title litigants and considers several possible explanations for these
effects. It asserts that political, legal, and social factors produce constitutional
change on litigation. It concludes that constitutional impacts are best understood
in a broader context than traditionally considered by legal scholars.
Rights, supra note 30; THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE, supra note 30; Box OF TREASURES OR
EMPTY Box? TWENTY YEARS OF SECTION 35 (Ardith Walkem & Halie Bruce eds., 2003);
FLANAGAN, supra note 40; ABORIGINAL AND TREATY RIGHTS IN CANADA (Michael Asch ed.,
1997).
42. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
43. Legal impact studies after Miranda have looked at a wide variety of topics,
including the impact of Miranda warnings on law enforcement and rates of confessions.
See, e.g., Nat'l Center for Policy Analysis, Handcuffing the Cops: Miranda's Harmful
Effects on Law Enforcement (1998), http://www.ncpa.org/studies/s2l8/s2l8b.html; Richard
H. Seeburger & R. Stanton Wettick, Jr., Miranda in Pittsburgh - A Statistical Study, in LAW
& SOCIETY: READINGS ON THE SOCIAL STUDY OF LAW 550 (Stewart Macaulay et al. eds.,
1995); Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L. REv. 1519 (1967).
44. See, e.g., Epp, Do Bills of Rights Matter?, supra note 11, at 765.
45. VAN Conf, supra note 25, at 35.
46. Id. at 35.
47. Raquel Yrigoyen Fajardo, Peru: Pluralist Constitution, Monist Judiciary - A
Post-Reform Assessment, in MULTICULTURALISM IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 29, at 158.
48. Id. at 158.
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This article uses comparative historical analysis to examine whether the
constitutional recognition of Aboriginal rights increases the legal recognition and
protection of Aboriginal title claims brought in Canadian courts. 9 Aboriginal title
claims in Canada provide an excellent case study because Canada has one of the
longest histories of constitutional incorporation of Aboriginal rights, a high level
of institutional development, and an extended history of Aboriginal title claims.
Aboriginal title claims are central to Aboriginal rights claims because the basis of
many Aboriginal rights claims stems from Aboriginal peoples' possession and
occupation of land."0 In addition to the importance of Aboriginal title to
Aboriginal rights in general, Aboriginal title was recognized under the common
law and thus allows for evaluation of one of the major arguments against the
impacts of constitutional change, namely that over time the common law would
have evolved in the same way.5
Part II looks at what, if anything, has happened to Aboriginal title
doctrine since Aboriginal rights were constitutionally recognized in 1982. It
analyzes whether Aboriginal title doctrine has changed since constitutional
incorporation by examining the Canadian Supreme Court's jurisprudence on
Aboriginal title. It concludes that the jurisprudence relating to Aboriginal title
doctrine has changed since 1982.
Part III discusses whether the change in Aboriginal title doctrine matters
by determining whether the number of Aboriginal title claims has increased since
Aboriginal rights were constitutionally incorporated in 1982. It categorizes
Aboriginal title claims cases before the Canadian courts into two time periods,
before and after constitutional incorporation, to determine whether the recognition
of Aboriginal rights has opened the door for the adjudication of Aboriginal title
claims.
Part IV suggests a preliminary framework for understanding these
changes in Aboriginal title litigation. It evaluates what influence, if any, the
constitutional incorporation of Aboriginal rights has had on Aboriginal title
litigation and doctrine. It attempts to determine whether constitutional
incorporation has had a measurable effect on the bringing of Aboriginal title
claims and the recognition of Aboriginal title by considering some of the possible
factors that could be influencing Aboriginal title claims and doctrine. It analyzes
the underlying arguments for the claims to discover other foundations for
affirming Aboriginal title claims, including international law and the common
49. This article does not analyze the impacts of the constitutional recognition of
Aboriginal rights on the claims settlement negotiations in Canada. Instead it focuses on the
bringing of Aboriginal title claims in Canadian courts. Further, while it acknowledges that
the two processes are intertwined, the interplay between them is beyond the scope of this
article.
50. Kent McNeil, Aboriginal Title and Aboriginal Rights: What's the Connection?,
36 ALTA. L. REV. 117, 118-23 (1997).
51. See generally Strauss, Common Law, supra note 10.
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law. It argues that section 35 has influenced Aboriginal title litigation because
both Aboriginal peoples and the Supreme Court of Canada rely on section 35 in
their presentation and analysis of these claims. Part IV also considers
nondoctrinal factors that could influence the changes in Aboriginal title litigation.
In particular, it looks at changes in the judiciary and the rise of legal support
networks to determine if either of these played a major role in the changes. It
argues that while some changes in the judiciary have occurred and a legal support
network is slowly developing, these factors cannot completely account for the
changes in Aboriginal title litigation. The evidence indicates that while section 35
may not have directly caused the changes, it has served as a means for the changes
to occur. This article concludes that both doctrinal and nondoctrinal factors
influence the impact of formal constitutional change and that these effects are best
understood by placing them in a broader social context.
II. PARLIAMENT CONSTITUTIONALIZED ABORIGINAL RIGHTS,
NOW WILL JUDGES RECOGNIZE AND ENFORCE THEM: HAS
ABORIGINAL TITLE DOCTRINE CHANGED SINCE 1982?
Part 1I argues that Aboriginal title doctrine in Canada has changed since
Aboriginal rights were constitutionally incorporated in 1982. By focusing on the
decisions of the highest legal authority in Canada - the Supreme Court - Part II
analyzes the jurisprudence related to Aboriginal title and how it has evolved since
1982. It contends that while Aboriginal title was recognized under the common
law, the Supreme Court of Canada has revised its earlier Aboriginal title doctrine
since 1982. The law related to Aboriginal title has changed in five identifiable
ways.52 First, the Supreme Court of Canada has expressly held that Aboriginal
title, as a distinct kind of Aboriginal right, has been recognized and affirmed by
section 35(1). 3 Second, the Court has defined the content, nature, and scope of
Aboriginal title, which remained indeterminate prior to constitutional
incorporation. Third, the Court has expanded the types of evidence admissible in
Aboriginal title cases to ensure that Aboriginal peoples are given a fair
opportunity to prove Aboriginal title claims. Fourth, the Court has allowed for the
payment of interim costs in Aboriginal title cases under certain circumstances.
Finally, the Court has held that both federal and provincial governments have a
duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples when making decisions that may
adversely affect unproven Aboriginal title and rights claims.
52. The author makes no normative claims about these changes and does not wish to
enter into the debate over whether Aboriginal title law has changed dramatically enough in
the past twenty years. See, e.g., Borrows, Frozen Rights, supra note 30; THE QUEST FOR
JUSTICE, supra note 30; FLANAGAN, supra note 39.
53. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1026-27.
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The first major change to Aboriginal title doctrine has been the definition
and recognition of the right as being constitutionally protected under section 35.
Although Canadian courts recognized Aboriginal title under the common law,54
the scope, nature, and content of this right were never defined. While Aboriginal
peoples did not bring many Aboriginal title claims in Canadian courts until
1969," questions about Aboriginal title reached the Supreme Court of Canada in
other kinds of cases much earlier.
The Supreme Court of Canada, and the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council, the court of final appeal in Canada until 1949,56 first discussed the issue
of Aboriginal title in St. Catherine's Milling & Lumber Co. v. The Queen.57 This
case did not involve an Aboriginal title claim,58 but a dispute between the
Canadian federal government and the Province of Ontario over which
governmental entity owned land after Aboriginal title had been surrendered by
treaty.5 9 In dicta, both the Canadian Supreme Court and the Privy Council in St.
Catherine's Milling noted that Aboriginal title was a "personal and usufractory
right" granted by the Royal Proclamation of 1763.' Neither the Court nor their
Lordships, however, analyzed the nature of Aboriginal title.61 Both the Supreme
Court of Canada and the Privy Council glossed over the issue of Aboriginal title,
merely finding that the Saulteaux Tribes of the 1873 Treaty had Aboriginal title to
surrender through the Treaty.6 2 Both then upheld the Province's claim to the
treaty land cession.63
54. See, e.g., St. Catherine's Milling & Lumber Co. v. The Queen, [1888] 14 App.
Cas. 46, 54-55 (P.C.); Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313,
376 (Hall, J., dissenting).
55. See infra Part II.
56. CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, AcTIVISTS, AND SUPREME
COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 161 (1998).
57. [1887] 13 S.C.R. 577; [1888] 14 App. Cas. at 46.
58. Nor were any Aboriginal peoples represented in these proceedings or given an
opportunity to present their understanding of the 1873 Treaty to the courts. JAMES (SAKEJ)
YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON ET AL., ABORIGINAL TENURE IN THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA
223 (2000).
59. [1888] 14App. Cas. at 46.
60. HENDERSON, supra note 58, at 222.
61. [1888] 14 App. Cas. at 55 ("There was a great deal of learned discussion at the
Bar with respect to the precise quality of the Indian right, but their Lordships do not
consider it necessary to express any opinion on that point."); see also HENDERSON, supra
note 58, at 222.
62. HENDERSON, supra note 58, at 222-23.
63. The Privy Council and the Supreme Court supported this holding with widely
varying interpretations of the Constitution Act, 1867.
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The Privy Council's dicta in St. Catherine's Milling was the final judicial
discussion on Aboriginal title for almost 100 years.6' In 1973, the Supreme Court
of Canada heard its first Aboriginal title claim.65 In Calder v. Attorney-General of
British Columbia,66 the Nisga'a"7 of Northwestern British Columbia sought a
declaration that they had Aboriginal title to 1,000 square miles of land and that
this title had not been lawfully extinguished. 68 The Canadian Supreme Court split
evenly in Calder over whether the Nisga'a had Aboriginal title with full status and
enforceable rights at the common law. Three justices held that the Nisga'a had
Aboriginal title that had not been lawfully extinguished, and they were inclined to
issue a declaration to that effect. 69 Three justices found that even if the Nisga'a
had Aboriginal title, it had been extinguished.7 ° A final justice ruled that the case
was improperly brought because such actions were not allowed under British
Columbia law, and, thus, did not consider the question of Nisga'a title at all.7
While the court did not unequivocally recognize the Nisga'a's Aboriginal title
claim in Calder or the right of any Aboriginal peoples to bring Aboriginal title
claims, the Court hinted for the first time that Aboriginal title did not stem from
the Royal Proclamation of 1763.72 The Privy Council in St. Catherine's Milling
had mentioned only the Royal Proclamation as a source of Aboriginal title,73 but
the Court's language in Calder suggested an independent, non-Proclamation
source of Aboriginal title. 4 Also, for the first time, three Justices of the Supreme
Court, in the dissenting opinion, expressly recognized the existence of Aboriginal
title and Aboriginal title claims.75  While many scholars view Calder as
64. HENDERSON, supra note 58, at 228 ("The St. Catherine's Milling decision was still
considered controlling law."). Although the St. Catherine's Milling decision is still
considered good law, it has been questioned over the years. See, e.g., Attorney-General for
Canada v. Giroux, [1916] 53 S.C.R. 172, 197 (Duff, J., concurring) (distinguishing St.
Catherine's Milling on the ground that the statutory provisions under which the reserve in
question had been created conferred beneficial ownership on the Indian Band); Cardinal v.
Attorney General of Alberta, [1974] S.C.R. 695, 701 (accepting that Indians may have a
beneficial interest in a reserve).
65. Kent McNeil, The Onus of Proof of Aboriginal Title, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 775,
777-78 (1999).
66. [1973] S.C.R. 313.
67. The Justices of the Supreme Court spelled Nisga'a as "Nishga." See id. at 317.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 345-46 (Hall, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 345.
71. Id. at 426-27 (Pigeon, J., dissenting).
72. Calder, [1973] S.C.R. at 322-23 (majority opinion); see also HENDERSON, supra
note 58, at 229.
73. [1888] 14App. Cas. at 53-54.
74. Calder, [1973] S.C.R. at 322-23.
75. Id. at 375-77 (Hall, J., dissenting).
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demonstrating that Canadian courts were open to Aboriginal title claims,7" the
Court's decision was far from definitive as to whether Aboriginal peoples could
prevail on such claims, and the existence, nature, and content of Aboriginal title
under the common law remained undefined.77
In 1977, the Supreme Court of Canada heard another Aboriginal title
claim on appeal from the Court of Appeal for the Northwest Territory in Paulette
v. The Queen.7 8 In Paulette, sixteen Indian chiefs had asked the Register of Titles
to file a caveat claiming Aboriginal title in some 400,000 square miles of land in
the Northwest Territories.7 9 The Register of Titles then referred the chiefs to the
courts."0 The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a caveat could not
be filed on unpatented Crown land.S" The Court did nothing to clarify Aboriginal
title doctrine or reconcile its various reasons for the decision in Calder.
While Calder and Paulette were percolating through the courts in the late
1960s and early 1970s, the Canadian government commenced discussions about
constitutional reform." These proposed constitutional reforms, including the
repatriation of the Canadian Constitution and rejection of the Westminster model
of parliamentary supremacy,83 did not materialize until 1982.84 As part of these
constitutional reforms, several new sections were added to the Constitution,
including a Charter of Rights and Freedoms and a separate section addressing the
constitutional status of Aboriginal rights.85
76. See, e.g., HENDERSON, supra note 58, at 229-30.
77. Kent McNeil, The Meaning of Aboriginal Title, in ABORIGINAL AND TREATY
RIGHTS IN CANADA 135, 136 (Michael Asch ed., 1997) [hereinafter McNeil, Meaning].
78. [1977] 2 S.C.R. 628.
79. Id. at 630.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 645.
82. Epp, supra note 56, at 159.
83. The Westminster model of parliamentary supremacy is the traditional British
style of government, in which the legislature is supreme in relation to all other
governmental institutions, including the judiciary, which does not have the power to declare
legislative acts unconstitutional. For more information on the Westminster model, see
generally ALBERT DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1885).
84. Epp, supra note 56, at 160-61.
85. Some scholars attribute the inclusion of section 35 in the Constitution Act, 1982
to the Supreme Court's decision in Calder. DICKASON, supra note 6, at 332-33. While the
Calder decision probably strengthened the position of Aboriginal rights advocacy groups
seeking constitutional recognition of their rights, the road to constitutional recognition was
a long and hard one. See, e.g., DAVID C. HAWKES, ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? 3-8 (1989). Further, some
Aboriginal peoples resisted the constitutional change. R. v. Sec'y of State, [1982] Q.B.
892, 894 (C.A.) (appeal taken from Alta.) (Canadian Aboriginal peoples suing the British
Crown for recognition of the continued obligation of the British Crown to them); Manuel v.
Does Constitutional Change Matter?
Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 states: "The existing aboriginal
and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and
affirmed."86  The section is written in extremely broad terms and leaves
Aboriginal rights undefined. For example, section 35(1) does not answer the
question of what an Aboriginal right is or whether Aboriginal title is one of the
Aboriginal rights that it recognizes and affirms.87 Further, the inclusion of the
word "existing" was believed to limit the applicability of section 35(1) because
only Aboriginal and treaty rights existing at the time were protected. Finally,
section 35(1), unlike the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,88 does not
include any language to indicate whether the rights are judicially enforceable.
The Supreme Court of Canada directly addressed a question of
Aboriginal title for the first time after the enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982
in Ontario v. Bear Island Foundation.89 In that case, the Bear Island Foundation
had registered cautions against tracts of unceded land north of Lake Nipissing,
Ontario, on behalf of the Temegami Band of Indians, and the Attorney General of
Ontario had sought a declaration that Ontario had clear title to the land in
question.9 ° The Court dismissed the appeal and avoided any examination of the
specific nature of Aboriginal title by summarily finding that the right had been
extinguished.9 Once again the Court avoided making any decisive statements
about the nature and content of Aboriginal title. The Supreme Court would not
hear another Aboriginal title claim for more than six years.
While the Court largely managed to skirt Aboriginal title claims cases for
thirty years after Calder, this avoidance did not prevent the Court from regularly
discussing Aboriginal title in other Aboriginal rights cases. The lack of a clear
distinction between Aboriginal title and Aboriginal rights claims until 1996 placed
the Court in the inevitable position of having to address Aboriginal title in other
Aboriginal rights cases because claimants often brought claims to Aboriginal
Attorney-General of England, [1983] Ch. 77, 81 (C.A.) (Aboriginal peoples seeking
declaration that the Constitution Act, 1982 was ultra vires).
86. Constitution Act, 1982, Canada Act, 1982, sched. B, pt. II, § 35(1) (U.K.), as
reprinted in R.S.C., No. 44 (Appendix 1985).
87. Section 35(2) does define Aboriginal peoples to include "the Indian, Inuit and
M~tis peoples of Canada." Id. § 35(2). This definition, of course, leaves open the question
of who is Indian, Inuit, and M~tis. For a detailed discussion of who is Aboriginal in
Canada, see ABORIGINAL RIGHTS LITIGATION (Joseph Eliot Magnet & Dwight A. Dorey
eds., 2003).
88. Constitution Act, 1982, Canada Act 1982, sched. B, pt. I, § 24 (U.K.), as
reprinted in R.S.C., No. 44 (Appendix 1985). Courts have enforced sections 35 through
52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.
89. [1991] 2 S.C.R. 570.
90. Id. at 573.
91. Id. at575.
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hunting and fishing rights as Aboriginal title claims.92 In Guerin v. The Queen, a
non-constitutional case about the surrender of reserve lands, the Court suggested
that Aboriginal peoples "had rights to their own lands by virtue of their own laws
prior to European colonization. It also stated that Aboriginal interests in
reserve land were the same as their Aboriginal title.94 Similarly, in R. v. Adams, a
fishing rights case, the Court found that Aboriginal title claims were simply one
manifestation of a broader-based concept of Aboriginal rights.95 Despite these
comments, the Court had yet to address an Aboriginal title claim for real property
and define the content and nature of Aboriginal title.
Two years after the Constitution Act, 1982 incorporated Aboriginal
rights into the Canadian Constitution, hereditary chiefs of the Gitksan and
Wet'suwet'en bands in British Columbia filed a lawsuit claiming Aboriginal title
to over 58,000 square kilometers of land.96 British Columbia counterclaimed,
arguing that the chiefs had no interest in the land, or alternatively, that they only
had a claim for monetary compensation against the Canadian government. 97
Almost fifteen years later in 1997, this case, Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,
reached the Supreme Court of Canada. 98 The Supreme Court remanded the case
for retrial on technical grounds due to a defect in the pleadings.99 Before doing so,
however, the Court addressed the content of Aboriginal title, the requirements for
its proof, and its recognition and protection under section 35(l)."o
The Supreme Court's decision in Delgamuukw represented a shift from
its earlier precedent on Aboriginal title in three ways. To begin with, for the first
time, the Supreme Court in Delgamuukw defined the right of Aboriginal title and
determined that this right was constitutionally recognized in section 35(1).
Second, the Supreme Court established the tests for proof of and infringement
upon Aboriginal title. Third, the Supreme Court determined the kind of evidence
admissible in Aboriginal title cases.
92. See, e.g., R. v. Ct6, [19961 3 S.C.R. 139, 3; R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101,
3.
93. McNeil, Meaning, supra note 77, at 136.
94. Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, 379.
95. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101, 25.
96. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, was originally filed as a
claim under the Land Titles Act. After Calder, a few Aboriginal title claims were filed
under the Land Titles Act. These suits sought encumbrances on land based on Aboriginal
title claims. See, e.g., Paulette v. The Queen, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 628; Cook v. Beckman,
[1990] 84 Sask. R. 89, 4 (Ct. App.). These cases sought encumbrances on land based on
Aboriginal title claims.
97. Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1029.
98. See id. at 1010.
99. Id. at 1063.
100. Id. at 1061.
Does Constitutional Change Matter?
The Supreme Court in Delgamuukw developed its earlier Aboriginal title
jurisprudence by defining the right of Aboriginal title for the first time and finding
that it was a constitutionally protected right under section 35(1). The Court
explained that the only source of Aboriginal title is occupation of the land prior to
the Crown's assertion of sovereignty over what is now Canada.' Thus, the Court
finally fully departed from the dicta in St. Catherine's Milling, which indicated
that the source of Aboriginal title was the Royal Proclamation of 1763.
The Court defined Aboriginal title as a proprietary right: it is "an interest
in the land" and a "right to the land itself."'0 2 In the majority opinion, then Chief
Justice Lamer rejected both the plaintiffs argument that Aboriginal title under
section 35(1) was tantamount to inalienable fee simple and the respondent's
argument that Aboriginal title merely connoted a bundle of rights rather than an
independent right or only meant an Aboriginal right to use and occupy the land. 103
Then he explained the content of Aboriginal title:
Aboriginal title is a right in land and, as such, is more than the
right to engage in specific activities which may be themselves
aboriginal rights. Rather, it confers the right to use land for a
variety of activities, not all of which need be aspects of
practices, customs, and traditions which are integral to the
distinctive cultures of aboriginal societies. Those activities do
not constitute the right per se; rather, they are parasitic on the
underlying title."°
The Court thus defined Aboriginal title as distinct from both Aboriginal rights and
a fee simple interest in the land.
The Court identified Aboriginal title as sui generis and noted that its sui
generis nature triggered its various dimensions. 5 The dimensions of Aboriginal
title include its inalienability to third parties, its status as a collective and
communally held right, and its inherent limitation."m  Aboriginal title is
101. Id. at 1082 ("[It is now clear that although aboriginal title was recognized by the
Proclamation, it arises from prior occupation of Canada by aboriginal peoples.").
102. Id. at 1081, 1095-96. The Court's recognition of Aboriginal title as a
constitutionally protected property right distinguishes Aboriginal title from other property
rights. Property rights were not included in the fundamental rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the Charter in 1982. KENT MCNEIL. EMERGING JUSTICE? ESSAYS ON
INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN CANADA AND AUSTRALIA 295 (2001) [hereinafter MCNEIL,
EMERGING JUSTICE?].
103. Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1080 ("The content of aboriginal title, in fact,
lies somewhere in-between these two positions.").
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1081.
106. Id. at 1081-82.
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inalienable because it cannot be transferred, sold, or surrendered to anyone other
than the Crown. °7 It is a collective right because it is held communally by all
members of an Aboriginal nation rather than by individual Aboriginal persons."'
Before addressing whether Aboriginal title is inherently limited, the
Court emphasized that Aboriginal title "encompasses the right to exclusive use
and occupation of the land."' 9 This exclusive use and occupation is not limited to
purposes which are aspects of those Aboriginal practices, customs, and traditions,
which are integral to distinctive Aboriginal cultures."' The Court stated that,
despite the underdeveloped nature of Aboriginal title jurisprudence, nothing
suggested that Aboriginal practices, customs, and traditions are a qualifier on the
right of Aboriginal title.' Further, the Court stated that Aboriginal interests in
Aboriginal title mirror Aboriginal interests in reserve lands and should be
interpreted as broadly." 1
2
Despite asserting that Aboriginal title is not generally limited, the Court
did find an inherent limit to Aboriginal title in that "lands subject to aboriginal
title cannot be put to such uses as may be irreconcilable with the nature of the
occupation of that land and the relationship that the particular group has had with
the land.'". The Court suggested that such an irreconcilable use would occur if
occupation to the land were established based on the use of the land as a hunting
ground and then the Aboriginal nation sought to strip mine the property.'
In addition to defining the nature, scope, and content of Aboriginal title,
the Court in Delgamuukw found that Aboriginal title is a constitutionally protected
right under section 35(1)." 5 The Court explained that section 35(1) did not create
constitutional rights but rather extended constitutional protections to Aboriginal
rights existing under the common law in 1982."' As a constitutionally protected
107. Id. at 1081.
108. Id. at 1082-83 ("Decisions with respect to that land are also made by that
community.").
109. Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1083.
110. Id.
11. Id. at 1084.
112. Id. at 1086 ("On the basis of Guerin, lands held pursuant to aboriginal title, like
reserve lands, are also capable of being used for a broad variety of purposes."). Some
scholars have interpreted the Court's statements about the breadth of the right of Aboriginal
title to include natural resources on and under the land whether or not those resources were
utilized by the Aboriginal nation prior to the assertion of Crown sovereignty. MCNEIL,
EMERGING JUSTICE?, supra note 102, at 134.
113. Delgamuukw, [1997] S.C.R. at 1089.
114. Id. For a critique of the Court's creation of this inherent limit as paternalistic, see
MCNEIL, EMERGING JUSTICE?, supra note 102, at 116-22.
115. Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1091 ("Aboriginal title at common law is
protected in its full form by s[ection] 35(1).").
116. Id. at 1092.
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right, the Court noted that Aboriginal title could not be extinguished by either
federal or provincial governments after 1982. Further, the constitutional
recognition of Aboriginal title changed the remedies available in Aboriginal title
cases by providing a constitutional remedy - namely, that the laws infringing on
the right can be declared unconstitutional. In recognizing Aboriginal title as a
constitutionally protected right, the Court reiterated the distinction it drew
between Aboriginal title and other Aboriginal rights in R. v. Adams."7 The Court
explained, "although aboriginal title is a species of aboriginal right recognized and
affirmed by s[ection] 35(1), it is distinct from other aboriginal rights because it
arises where the connection of a group with a piece of land 'was of a central
significance to their distinctive culture."" 1 8 The Court confirmed that Aboriginal
rights may exist independent of Aboriginal title.
The Supreme Court also expanded Aboriginal title doctrine in
Delgamuukw by establishing the test for proof of Aboriginal title. The Court
established a three-part test for proving Aboriginal title and placed the burden of
proving Aboriginal title on Aboriginal peoples." 9 In order to make a prima facie
case of Aboriginal title, an Aboriginal nation must show the following: (1) the
land was occupied prior to Crown assertion of sovereignty, (2) there was
continuity between present and pre-sovereignty occupation, and (3) that
occupation was exclusive when the Crown asserted sovereignty.
20
The Court found that Aboriginal peoples may meet the first prong of the
test by showing that they occupied the land at the time Crown sovereignty was
asserted. 12' Occupation may be proven by showing actual physical presence or
through proof of the existence of a system of Aboriginal law under which
Aboriginal title to the territory existed. 22 In this respect, for the first time, the
Court acknowledged that Aboriginal laws and perspectives (in addition to physical
presence) are central to Aboriginal title claims.
To meet the second prong of the test, continuity, the Court stated that the
Aboriginal nation must show substantial maintenance of the connection between
the community and the land. 23  Noting that it may be difficult to present
conclusive evidence of continual occupation, the Court rejected the idea that an
Aboriginal nation has to demonstrate "an unbroken chain of continuity" between
117. Id. at 1093-94 (citing R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101, 25).
118. Id. at 1094 (quoting Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101, 26).
119. Id. at 1097.
120. Id.
121. Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1099-1100; see also MCNEIL, EMERGING
JUSTICE?, supra note 102, at 105-07.
122. Id.
123. Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1103 (quoting Mabo v. Queensland (1992) 107
A.L.R. 1 (Austl.)).
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present and past occupation. The Court stated that changes and disruptions in
occupation would not preclude a claim for Aboriginal title.'24
Finally, the Court explained that to meet the exclusivity prong, an
Aboriginal nation would have to demonstrate its ability to exclude others from use
and occupation of the land.' 25 The Court found both common law and Aboriginal
perspectives equally important to proof of exclusivity. 126 It recognized that
exclusive occupation may be demonstrated even if other Aboriginal groups were
present or frequented the claimed lands. 2 7 It also noted that even if Aboriginal
title could not be proven because occupation and use were not exclusive, the
Aboriginal nation may have a claim for Aboriginal rights short of Aboriginal
title. 1
28
In this way, the Court established a test for proving Aboriginal title.
While prior to the Delgamuukw decision Aboriginal peoples were presumed to be
able to bring claims for Aboriginal title under Calder, the standards of proof for
such a claim remained uncertain because the Supreme Court had not conclusively
spoken on the matter. In fact, prior to Delgamuukw, some confusion existed in the
lower courts post-Calder as to what the appropriate test was and how to apply
it.129
The Court also spoke for the first time in Delgamuukw about the kind of
evidence Aboriginal peoples could use to prove Aboriginal title claims. In
perhaps its boldest move, the Supreme Court departed from traditional common
law rules of evidence in recognizing the vital role and admissibility of oral
histories in Aboriginal title cases. Relying on its previous interpretation of section
35(1) in R. v. Van der Peet,130 the Court reiterated its statement that courts must
take into account the perspective of Aboriginal peoples in adjudicating Aboriginal
rights claims. 13' The Court stated that the laws of evidence must be adapted:
so that the aboriginal perspective on their practices, customs and
traditions and on their relationship with the land, are given due
weight by the courts. In practical terms, this requires the courts
to come to terms with the oral histories of aboriginal societies,
which, for many aboriginal nations, are the only record of their
past. 132
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1104.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1106.
129. See, e.g., Baker Lake (Hamlet) v. Canada, [1980] 1 F.C. 518, 555-57.
130. [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507.
131. Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1065-66.
132. Id. at 1067.
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The Court detailed the problems with the use of oral histories under
common law rules of evidence, particularly the question of hearsay, and noted that
the oral histories of Aboriginal peoples have been and would continue to be
"consistently and systematically undervalued by the Canadian legal system"
unless they were admissible in Aboriginal rights cases. 33 It then concluded that
the inadmissibility of Aboriginal oral traditions could prevent Aboriginal peoples
from ever being able to establish their historical claims and that this would be
unacceptable under the Constitution.1
Finally, the Court in Delgamuukw explained the extent of constitutional
protection of Aboriginal title under section 35(1). While Aboriginal title is a
constitutionally protected property right, it is not an absolute right.'35 The Court
emphasized that the purpose of section 35(1) is "to reconcile the prior presence of
aboriginal peoples in North America with the assertion of Crown sovereignty.
' 136
The Court explained that section 35(1) requires that infringements of Aboriginal
rights by provincial and federal governments must meet a test of justification.137 It
then applied the two-part test for the infringement of Aboriginal rights established
in R. v. Sparrow.138 First, any infringement of the Aboriginal right has to be "in
furtherance of a legislative objective that is compelling and substantial."'' 39 It
explained:
Aboriginal rights are a necessary part of the reconciliation of
aboriginal societies with the broader political community of
which they are part; limits placed on those rights are, where the
objectives furthered by those limits are of sufficient importance
to the broader community as a whole, equally a necessary part of
that reconciliation. 140
Second, the infringement must be consistent with the special fiduciary
relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown."'4 This inquiry is legally
and factually specific to the content of each claim of infringement, but should
include an assessment of the amount of infringement and consultation with the
133. Id. at 1074.
134. Id. at 1077-78.
135. Id. at 1107.
136. Id. at 1096.
137. Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1107.
138. Id. at 1107.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1108.
141. Id.
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Aboriginal nation. 4 ' The Court then found that the province of British Columbia
did not have the power to extinguish Aboriginal rights after 1871, allowed the
appeal, and remanded for a new trial to determine whether the First Nations had
Aboriginal title.1
4 3
Recently, the Court clarified the precedent it established in
Delgamuukw.'" On July 20, 2005, the Supreme Court of Canada directly
addressed Aboriginal title claims for the first time since Delgamuukw in R. v.
Bernard and R. v. Marshall.4 While these cases primarily involved questions of
treaty rights, the Court, unlike in Delgamuukw, actually heard the merits of and
rendered a decision on the Aboriginal title claims in Bernard. For the first time
since Delgamuukw shifted Aboriginal title doctrine away from the common law,
the Court provided practical guidance on what is necessary to make a successful
Aboriginal title claim and then applied it to a specific set of facts.
The Court disposed of two companion cases in the Bernard decision. In
the first case, Bernard, a Mi'kmaq Indian, was arrested for the unlawful
possession of logs in violation of the Crown Lands and Forest Act, 1980.146
Similarly, in Marshall, Mi'kmaq Indians were charged with the unauthorized
cutting of timber on Crown lands in violation of the Crown Lands Act, 1989.' In
both cases, the defendants argued that they did not need Crown authorization to
log on Crown lands because they had either treaty rights to engage in commercial
logging or Aboriginal title to the land.' 48 The Supreme Court rejected the treaty
rights and Aboriginal title claims, finding that the Mi'kmaq could not log on
Crown lands without authorization.
Before determining that the Mi'kmaq did not have Aboriginal title to the
Crown lands, the Court clarified its decision in Delgamuukw in several ways.
First, the Court reiterated that section 35 is a constitutionally protected common
142. Id. at 1109.
143. Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1122-23.
144. The Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the position it took in Delgamuukw in cases
involving land issues other than unextinguished Aboriginal title. See, e.g., Osoyoos Indian
Band v. Oliver, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 746, 796 146.
145. 2005 S.C.C. 43, 30005, [2005] S.C.J. No. 44 QUICKLAW (July 20, 2005). The
two companion cases in Bernard are related to two earlier Supreme Court cases
adjudicating Mi'kmaq treaty and fishing rights. R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456, 91 4
(finding that the Mi'kmaq have treaty rights to trade in the products of their fishing,
hunting, and gathering); R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533, 1 48 (rejecting petition for
rehearing).
146. Bernard, 2005 S.C.C. 43, at T 3.
147. Id. 9 2.
148. Id. T1 37. The defendants advanced three different arguments for Aboriginal title:
common law, the Royal Proclamation, and Governor Belcher's Proclamation. Id. The
latter two arguments contend that these proclamations reserved the land to the Mi'kmaq.
This article's analysis will focus on the common law arguments because they are the only
ones directly related to section 35.
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law right, and that as such, it can no longer be extinguished by clear legislative act
unless the Crown can establish that its infringement on title "is justified in
pursuance of a compelling and substantial legislative objective for the good of
larger society." 49 Then, the Court focused on refining its test for proof of an
Aboriginal title claim. It noted that the appellate courts in each case had applied a
more lenient standard than the trial courts, and explained that this raised issues "as
to the standard of occupation required to prove title, including the related issues of
exclusivity of occupation, application of this requirement to nomadic peoples, and
continuity."5'
Before determining the appropriate standard, the Court considered two
concepts central to inquiries into the existence of Aboriginal rights. First, the
Court elaborated on "the requirement that both aboriginal and European common
law perspectives [I be considered."'51 The Court explained that this requirement
means that courts must answer the question of "whether the aboriginal practice at
the time of assertion of European sovereignty . .. translates into a modem legal
right, and if so, what right?"'5 2 To answer this question, the Court stated:
The Court must consider the pre-sovereignty practice from the
perspective of the aboriginal people. But in translating it into a
common law right, the Court must also consider the European
perspective; the nature of the right at common law must be
examined to determine whether a particular aboriginal practice
fits it. This exercise in translating aboriginal practices to modem
rights must not be conducted in a formalistic or narrow way.
The Court should take a generous view of the aboriginal practice
and should not insist on exact conformity to the precise legal
parameters of the common law right. The question is whether
the practice corresponds to the core concepts of the legal right
claimed. 1
53
The Court emphasized the role of Aboriginal perspectives in grounding this
analysis and held that "[a]bsolute congruity is not required, so long as the
practices engage the core idea of the modem right."'54
The Court further expounded upon the process of reconciling Aboriginal
and European perspectives in describing the second underlying concept. It
defined the second concept as "the variety of aboriginal rights that may be
149. Id. 39.
150. Id. 40.
151. Bernard, [2005] S.C.C. 43, 45.
152. Id. 48.
153. Id.
154. Id. 50.
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affirmed"'55 and described it as flowing from the process of reconciling
Aboriginal and European perspectives. The Court explained that the
reconciliation process seeks to determine "what modem right best corresponds to
the pre-sovereignty aboriginal practice, as examined from the aboriginal
perspective."'5 6 It reiterated the distinction that it drew in Delgamuukw between
Aboriginal title and Aboriginal rights by identifying Aboriginal title as only one of
several independent Aboriginal rights' and emphasized the context-specific
nature of common law title.'58
After its review of these general principles, the Court clarified the
specific requirements for title established in Delgamuukw as proof of "'exclusive'
pre-sovereignty 'occupation' of the land by their forebears."'59  It started by
looking at what it meant by occupation through physical presence in
Delgamuukw. '" The Court explained "that exploiting the land, rivers or seaside
for hunting, fishing or other resources may translate into aboriginal title to the
land if the activity was sufficiently regular and exclusive to comport with title at
common law."'' The Court stated that seasonal or occasional use was generally
not "sufficiently regular and exclusive" to prove title.' 62 Instead, and "more
typically, seasonal hunting and fishing rights exercised in a particular area will
translate into a hunting or fishing right."' 63 It then reiterated that to determine
which rights the traditional practices correspond to, courts are to look at "whether
155. Id. 45.
156. Id. 52.
157. Bernard, [2005] S.C.C. 43, 53. Several scholars have criticized the Court for
artificially separating Aboriginal title from Aboriginal rights. See, e.g., Douglas Harris,
Indigenous Territoriality in Canadian Courts, in Box OF TREASURES OR EMPTY Box?
TWENTY YEARS OF SECTION 35, at 175 (Ardith Walkem & Halie Bruce eds., 2003).
158. Bernard, [2005] S.C.C. 43, 53. The Court described common law title as
recognizing the following: that possession is a factual matter dependent upon all the
circumstances and the nature of the land, "that a person with adequate possession for title
may choose to use it intermittently or sporadically," and "that exclusivity does not preclude
consensual arrangements that recognize shared title to the same parcel of land." Id. 54.
159. Id. 55.
160. In Delgamuukw, the Court may have established two ways to prove occupation,
either through actual physical presence or through proof of the existence of a system of
Aboriginal law under which Aboriginal title to the territory existed. Delgamuukw v. British
Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1099-1100; McNEIL, EMERGING JUSTICE?, supra note
102, at 106-08. Here the Court only discussed occupation as physical occupation.
Bernard, [2005] S.C.C. 43, 36. While the Court mentioned several ways of showing
physical occupation, it did not mention or discuss whether and how Aboriginal peoples may
be able to prove occupation through the existence of a system of Aboriginal law.
161. Bernard, [2005] S.C.C. 43, 158.
162. Id. [ 58-59.
163. Id. 1 58.
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the practices established by the evidence, viewed from the aboriginal perspective,
correspond to the core of the common law right claimed. ' ' 16
The Court continued on to discuss three sub-issues involved in Bernard:
exclusivity, nomadic possession, and continuity. The Court noted the difficulty in
determining exclusivity and may have taken a more lenient approach than
indicated in Delgamuukw. In the earlier case, it stated that to meet the exclusivity
requirement, Aboriginal peoples had to show that they had the ability to exclude.
The Court clarified that requirement by establishing that "evidence of acts of
exclusion is not required to establish aboriginal title."' 65 On the sub-issue of
nomadic possession, it found that nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples may be able
to make a claim to title if the degree of physical occupation or use is equivalent to
common law title."6 Finally, the Court determined that continuity requires
modem day claimants to "establish a connection with the pre-sovereignty group
upon whose practices they rely to assert title or claim to a more restricted right"
and to show that their connection with the land has been "of a central significance
to their distinctive culture."' 7
The Court concluded its clarification of Delgamuukw with a note on the
evidence that Aboriginal claimants can use to prove their rights. It reiterated the
importance of admitting oral histories to prove Aboriginal title claims by
explaining that all of the matters discussed may be proven using oral history. At
the same time, the Court qualified its earlier statements on oral history by saying
that it is only admissible if it meets two conditions. First, the oral history must
provide "evidence that would not otherwise be available or evidence of the
aboriginal perspective on the right claimed." '68  Second, the witness must
represent "a credible source of the particular people's history." 69
Having clarified what it said in Delgamuukw, the Court found that the
trial courts had applied the correct test in each case because "they required proof
of sufficiently regular and exclusive use of the cutting sites by Mi'kmaq people at
the time of the assertion of sovereignty."' 70 Finding no error in the test that was
applied, the Court considered whether the lower courts had correctly assessed the
evidence. The Court defined the test for assessing the evidence as "whether the
164. Id. q 60.
165. Id. 64-65.
166. Id. 66.
167. Bernard, [2005] S.C.C. 43, U 67-68.
168. Id. 1 68.
169. Id.
170. Id. 9 72. The Court rejected the appellate court's argument in Marshall that the
test applied by the trial court was too strict and that it was sufficient to prove occasional
entry and acts from which an intention to occupy the land could be inferred as leaving out
the requirement of "sufficiently regular and exclusive use" needed to establish title under
the common law. Id. 11 76.
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practices on a broad sense correspond to the right claimed."'' It then evaluated
the evidence and concluded that the trial judges had correctly assessed it.'72
Accordingly, the Court in Bernard clarified the test for proof of
Aboriginal title established in Delgamuukw. It reaffirmed many of the revisions
to Aboriginal title doctrine originally mentioned in Delgamuukw, including the
definition of Aboriginal title as a constitutional right and the establishment of tests
for the proof and infringement of the right. At the same time, the Court in
Bernard refined the test for proof of Aboriginal title by actual physical presence to
require proof of sufficiently regular and exclusive use of the sites by the
Aboriginal group at the time of the assertion of sovereignty.
In addition to the changes in Aboriginal title doctrine developed in
Delgamuukw and Bernard, the Canadian Supreme Court altered the law relating to
Aboriginal title doctrine in British Columbia v. Okanagan Indian Band.7 3 In
171. Id. % 78.
172. Bernard, [2005] S.C.C. 43, IT 78-83. While the decision was unanimous, two
judges disagreed with the majority's reasoning. In a strongly-worded concurrence, Justices
LeBel and Fish condemned the majority for over-focusing on the common law and ignoring
the crucial role that Aboriginal perspectives should play in the proof of Aboriginal title
claims. They criticized the majority for establishing a test that "might well amount to a
denial that any aboriginal title could have been created by. . . patterns of nomadic or semi-
nomadic occupation or use." Id. 126 (LeBel, J., concurring). They rejected the majority's
view of the role of Aboriginal perspective, and suggested the following:
[A]boriginal conceptions of territoriality, land-use and property should
be used to modify and adapt the traditional common law concepts of
property in order to develop an occupancy standard that incorporates
both the aboriginal and common law approaches. Otherwise, we might
be implicitly accepting the position that aboriginal peoples had no rights
in land prior to the assertion of Crown sovereignty because their views
of property or land use do not fit within Euro-centric
conceptions of property rights.
Id. 127. They argued that if, as the Court has said in the past, Aboriginal title is
a sui generis interest in land, then, like other section 35 rights, it "arises from the
prior possession of land and the prior social organisation and distinctive cultures
of aboriginal peoples on that land." Id. 129. Aboriginal perspectives on title
then must be given "equal consideration" in evaluating Aboriginal title claims, id.,
and could not be relegated to simply assisting in the translation of Aboriginal
practices into common law title. Id. 130.
173. [2003] 3 S.C.R. 371, 379. Despite increasing Aboriginal title claims litigation,
see infra Part III, the Supreme Court of Canada has only reviewed the merits of one
Aboriginal title claim on appeal since Delgamuukw. A review of lower court cases
applying the Delgamuukw tests are outside the scope of this article. For more information
on lower court application, see Kent McNeil, Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title in
Canada: Treaties, Legislation, and Judicial Discretion, 33 Or-rAWA L. REV. 301, 320-22
(2001-2002) [hereinafter McNeil, Extinguishment].
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2003, the Court heard its first Aboriginal title case involving an Aboriginal title
claim since Delgamuukw, an interlocutory appeal for interim costs in Okanagan
Indian Band. Four members of the Band received stop-work orders from the
Minister of Forests after they commenced logging on Crown land in British
Columbia in 1999.14 The Minister then started proceedings to enforce the
orders.'75 The Band "claimed that they had Aboriginal title to the lands in
question and were entitled to log them."' 76 The Band then filed a notice of a
constitutional question challenging the Forest Practices Code of British Columbia
Act, under which they were allegedly logging illegally.' The Minister requested
that the case go to trial rather than be summarily disposed of, and the Band
resisted full trial, arguing that they lacked the financial resources to fund a lengthy
trial.17 8 In the alternative, the Band argued that the court should use its discretion
to award interim costs so that the case could go to trial.'79 The Supreme Court
granted leave of appeal to determine whether the Minister should pay the interim
costs of the trial. 8 ° After explaining that there was no issue of a constitutional
right to funding in the case, the Court held that the case was of sufficient merit
that it should go to trial and that interim costs were appropriate because the
respondents were impecunious and could not proceed without interim costs. 8'
While the Court in Okanagan Indian Band did not address the Band's Aboriginal
title claim directly, it did depart from its earlier Aboriginal title jurisprudence
relating to Aboriginal title by finding that the case was sufficiently meritorious to
require the payment of interim costs so that the trial could proceed.
More recently, the Supreme Court of Canada has determined that federal
and provincial governments have a duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples when
making decisions that may adversely affect unproven Aboriginal title claims.8 2 In
November 2004, the Canadian Supreme Court issued its judgments in two related
Aboriginal title cases relating to Aboriginal title claims, Haida Nation v. British
Columbia and Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia. While the
174. Okanagan Indian Band, [2003] 3 S.C.R. at 380.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 380-81.
180. The British Columbia Supreme Court found that the case should go to trial but
refused to award interim costs. British Columbia v. Okanagan Indian Band, No. 29419,
[2000] B.C.T.C. 548, 126-27 (B.C.T.C. July 25, 2000), available at 2000 B.C.T.C.
LEXIS 1481. The British Columbia Court of Appeal also held that the case should go to
trial but reversed the lower court's decision that interim costs were inappropriate. British
Columbia v. Okanagan Indian Band, [2001] 95 B.C.L.R.3d 273, 39 (B.C. Ct. App.).
181. Okanagan Indian Band, [2003] 3 S.C.R. at 402.
182. Haida Nation v. British Columbia, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511; Taku River Tlingit First
Nation v. British Columbia, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550, 1 21.
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Court in the Haida Nation and Taku River cases did not adjudicate the two First
Nations' Aboriginal title claims, it did clarify the consultation requirement,
mentioned in Delgamuukw, that has to be met before Aboriginal title and rights
may be infringed. It unanimously established for the first time that both federal
and provincial governments have a duty to consult and accommodate Aboriginal
peoples when making decisions that may adversely impact unproven Aboriginal
title and rights claims.'83
In Haida Nation, the Court found this duty to consult grounded in the
honor of the Crown and section 35 of the Constitution."8 The duty arises "when
the Crown has knowledge, real or constructive, of the potential existence of the
aboriginal right or title and contemplates conduct that might adversely affect it."' 85
It explained that the scope of the duty to consult is "proportionate to a preliminary
assessment of the strength of the case supporting the existence of the fight or title,
and to the seriousness of the potentially adverse effect upon the right or title
claimed."' 86 The Court limited the duty to consultation rather than agreement.'87
It then held that British Columbia had a duty to consult with the Haida Nation,
which had a long-standing claim to Aboriginal title, about timber licensing, and
that it had failed to do so.'88
The Court applied the test it set out in Haida Nation in the Taku River
case. In that case, the Court found that British Columbia had a duty to consult
with the Taku River Tlingit First Nation, which had been in treaty negotiations
over its Aboriginal title claims with the Province since the late 1970s, about the
possible reopening of the Tulsequah Mine.' 89 While British Columbia had
fulfilled this duty by extensively including the First Nation in the environmental
assessment process, the Court required it to continue to consult with the First
Nation in other stages of the mine licensing."9
The Court's decisions in Haida Nation and Taku River demonstrate a
dramatic shift from the pre-constitutional treatment of Aboriginal title and rights
claims, because prior to constitutional incorporation, the Crown could unilaterally
extinguish Aboriginal title and rights.' 9 ' After constitutional incorporation, and
based in part on section 35, the Crown, either in the provincial or the federal
183. Haida Nation, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, IN 64-79; Taku River Tlingit First Nation,
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 550, 1 21.
184. [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511,1 20.
185. Id. 35.
186. Id. 39.
187. Id. 42 ("[T]here is no duty to agree; rather, the commitment is to a meaningful
process of consultation.").
188. Id. 178.
189. Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550, N 27-
28.
190. Id. U 46-47.
191. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1037.
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government, now has a duty to consult and accommodate Aboriginal peoples even
when their Aboriginal title and rights claims have yet to be proven. Further, Taku
River indicates that a high bar has to be met to fulfill this duty. Even though the
Supreme Court has yet to uphold an Aboriginal title claim,'92 there is no question
that the jurisprudence relating to Aboriginal title doctrine has changed since 1982.
The Court altered the doctrine in several ways in Delgamuukw. Most
significantly, the Court identified Aboriginal title as a constitutionally protected
common law right that cannot be extinguished after 1982 without substantial
justification by the Crown. In recognizing Aboriginal title as a constitutional
right, it extended constitutional remedies, including the declaration of legislation
as unconstitutional, to Aboriginal title cases. The Court also, for the first time,
defined the scope, nature, and content of Aboriginal tile, established the tests for
proof of and infringement upon Aboriginal title, and approved oral histories for
use as evidence in Aboriginal title cases. The Court reaffirmed and refined these
changes by clarifying its test for the proof of Aboriginal title claims in Bernard.
The Court continued to develop its Aboriginal title jurisprudence relating to
Aboriginal title in Okanagan Indian Band by ordering the payment of interim
costs, thereby reducing the financial burden on destitute Aboriginal peoples
192. Many Aboriginal scholars have criticized the Supreme Court for continuing the
colonial practices of the past. See, e.g., John Borrows, Sovereignty's Alchemy: An Analysis
of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 537, 540-41 (1999)
[hereinafter Borrows, Sovereignty's Alchemy]. To some extent, the Court's interpretation of
section 35(1) may undermine Aboriginal title claims. The Court has interpreted section
35(1) as facilitating reconciliation between Aboriginal peoples and the rest of Canada. This
interpretation of section 35(1) undercuts Aboriginal title claims by mandating that the
courts balance these claims with the rights of non-Aboriginals. John Borrows criticizes the
reconciliation approach as leading to absurd results, such as the Court in Delgamuukw
finding that British Columbia was prejudiced in that case by the defective pleadings. Id. at
549. Similarly, Kent McNeil identifies this approach as licensing lower courts to judicially
extinguish Aboriginal title even though the Supreme Court has decided that the federal and
provincial legislatures cannot extinguish Aboriginal title after 1982. McNeil,
Extinguishment, supra note 173, at 303. Despite the real possibility that the Court's
interpretation in Delgamuukw may undercut Aboriginal title rights, the majority in Canada
viewed the Delgamuukw decision as a win for Aboriginal peoples.
The Court's recent decision in Bernard appears to support the earlier criticisms of
Delgamuukw as possibly undercutting Aboriginal title claims. It suggests a "two steps
forward, one step back" approach to Aboriginal rights. While the decision in Delgamuukw
indicated that the jurisprudence on Aboriginal title may be moving two steps forward, the
decision in Bernard can be read as a definite step back. The Court rejected the common
law Aboriginal title claims and clarified a test that emphasizes the European perspective to
such a degree that it may be impossible for some Aboriginal peoples to establish their
Aboriginal title claims. R. v. Bernard, 2005 S.C.C. 43, 30005, [2005] S.C.J. No. 44
QUICKLAW, 126 (July 20, 2005) (LeBel, J., concurring). Thus, the reconciliation
approach may be undermining Aboriginal title claims in the very way that Borrows
predicted it could.
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defending Aboriginal title claims. Finally, the Court has recognized a duty to
consult and accommodate Aboriginal peoples when making decisions that may
adversely affect unproven Aboriginal title claims.
III. ABORIGINAL RIGHTS ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY RECOGNIZED,
ARE THE COURTS BEING USED TO ENFORCE THEM?
This Part considers how the changes to Aboriginal title doctrine matter
by investigating when and how claims to Aboriginal title are made. It looks at
claims made and adjudicated in Canadian courts from 1867 to 2005.'9' It
categorizes Aboriginal title cases before the Canadian courts into two time
periods, before and after constitutional recognition in section 35.194 Aboriginal
title cases are broadly defined as cases in which a party, either the plaintiff or the
defendant, has raised a claim of unextinguished Aboriginal title to land.' 95 It then
193. The last query of cases was conducted on September 30, 2005. The data-set may
not be complete if cases were filed and adjudicated later in 2005.
194. The data used here consist of all cases listed in the Canadian Native Law
Reporter and in the Westlaw CAN-ALLCASES database. The Canadian Native Law
Reporter contains reported and unreported Aboriginal law cases from all court levels and
jurisdictions in Canada. It does not include cases decided within two years of each other if
the second case does not vary from the first. Telephone Interview with Zandra Wilson,
Editor, Canadian Native Law Reporter (Nov. 22, 2004). It may also underreport provincial
court decisions because many provincial court decisions are not reported. Id.
195. This definition limits the cases considered as Aboriginal title claims by
eliminating many of the cases brought prior to the 1960s. The first cases in Canada to
address Aboriginal title were not brought as Aboriginal title claims, and Aboriginal peoples
were not even involved in the litigation. See, e.g., St. Catherines' Milling & Lumber Co. v.
The Queen, [1888] 14 App. Cas. 46, 46 (P.C.) (whether Dominion or Province owns land
surrendered by Saulteax Tribes in 1873 Treaty). It also may underreport early Aboriginal
title claims brought before Canadian and British courts because it does not include actions
to eject trespassers from Aboriginal lands, see, e.g., HARRING, supra note 3, at 41-54, and
similar complaints. Further it excludes claims not brought in courts, such as the claims and
complaints about land losses continually made to Indian agents. See, e.g., ROBIN JARVIS
BROWNLIE, A FATHERLY EYE: INDIAN AGENTS, GOVERNMENT POWER, AND ABORIGINAL
RESISTANCE IN ONTARIO, 1918-1939, at 81-98 (2003).
The definition also excludes most land rights cases dealing with Indian Reserves
because, in the majority of these cases, the issue is not Aboriginal title per se, but trespass,
surrender, or the Band's authority to tax. See, e.g., Osoyoos Indian Band v. Oliver, [2001] 3
S.C.R. 746, 1 (whether Band has authority to impose a tax on reserve land used by town
for canal); Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, 340-41 (whether Band surrendered
valuable reserve land for lease to a golf club).
Further, it excludes cases in which a party has raised a claim of Aboriginal title as a
basis for other Aboriginal rights, such as fishing or hunting rights. Prior to 1996, the
Supreme Court of Canada had not delineated the relationship between Aboriginal title to
land and other Aboriginal rights. See R. v. C6t6, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139, 3; R. v. Adams,
[1996] 3 S.C.R. 101, 3. Accordingly, prior to 1996 Aboriginal peoples brought claims to
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compares the cases in the two time periods to determine whether more Aboriginal
title claims were made after 1982. It concludes that more Aboriginal title claims
have been made since 1982.
The first case involving a question of Aboriginal title, Corinthe v.
Seminary of St. Sulpice, was adjudicated in 1912.196 Other cases are not reported
to have been filed and adjudicated for over fifty years after Corinthe, but
Aboriginal peoples actively made claims to Indian Agents, the Department of
Indian Affairs, the Crown, and the Privy Council throughout the first half of the
twentieth century.' 97 These claims largely fell on deaf ears and, in 1927, the
Canadian government amended the Indian Act to proscribe the bringing of
Aboriginal rights claims in Canadian courts.' 98 This prohibition on Aboriginal
claims remained for almost twenty-five years until it was repealed in 1951. 9
Despite the removal of the prohibition on Aboriginal title claims in 1951, the first
recent Aboriginal title case was not filed until 1969, by the Nisga'a Nation."°
Aboriginal title to fishing and hunting rights. It does, however, include cases in which
claimants made both a claim to land and to another Aboriginal right, such as hunting,
fishing, or self-government.
The definition also excludes Aboriginal title claims filed as comprehensive claims in
the British Columbia Treaty Commission, under the Canadian government's comprehensive
claims policy, or those involved in any other Indian claims process unless a related claim
has been filed in a court of law. In some of the included cases, the Aboriginal title claim is
in or has been in negotiations with the government and the Aboriginal claimants have sued
to clarify a particular question in the case, such as when the government has to consult with
the Aboriginal group before taking action adverse to the land involved in the Aboriginal
title claim. See, e.g., Haida Nation v. British Columbia, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, 38; Taku
River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550, I 27-28.
The inclusion or exclusion of any particular case is a judgment call made by the
author, and cases included or excluded may have been treated differently by another
scholar. Some cases were excluded because they appeared to include the same Aboriginal
title claim by the same First Nation and the author did not want to over-represent the
number of actual Aboriginal title claims. Compare Gitanyow First Nation v. British
Columbia, Nos. L012405, L021243, L021279, 114 A.C.W.S. (3d) 301 (B.C.S.C. Apr. 30,
2002), available at 2002 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 5472, with Lax Kw'Alaams Indian Band v.
British Columbia, No. L021483, 2002 B.C.D. Civ. J. 1212 (B.C.S.C. July 19, 2002),
available at 2002 B.C.D. Civ. J. LEXIS 588. For a complete list of included cases, see
infra note 201, which lists cases adjudicated before 1982, and note 204, which lists cases
after 1982.
196. [1912] 5 D.L.R. 263 (P.C.).
197. BROWNLIE, supra note 195, at 81-98.
198. THE REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, supra note 5, at
296.
199. Id.
200. Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313.
478 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law Vol. 22, No. 3
Chart 1 shows the number of cases adjudicated in Canadian trial courts
by year from Calder in 1969 to 2005. As Chart I illustrates, few Aboriginal title
claims were brought and adjudicated in Canadian courts before 1982. A search of
reported cases adjudicated in provincial and federal trial courts indicated that six
cases involving an unextinguished Aboriginal title claim were adjudicated before
1982.2°1 Of these, two cases were heard by the Supreme Court of Canada (see
Chart 2).202 The small number of claims brought before 1982 does not reflect a
lack of Aboriginal title claims, but uncertainty about whether such claims were
legally cognizable and could be brought in Canadian courts.2 °3
Chart 1: First Adjudications of Aboriginal Title
Cases by Year in Canada, 1969-2005 (N = 49)
8
7
CU
0 5
0 4-
Z2
1 ) , C
0 w r- r-
Delgamuukw Supreme
Court Decision
I F
Constitutional
Recognition of
Aboriginal Rights
Year
201. Corinthe, [1912] 5 D.L.R. 263 (P.C.); Calder v. Attorney-General of British
Columbia, [1970] 74 W.W.R. 481 (B.C. Ct. App. 1970), aff'd, [1973] S.C.R. 313; Paulette
v. The Queen, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 628; R. v. Derriksan, [1975] 52 D.L.R.3d 744 (B.C.S.C.),
aff'd, [1975] 60 D.L.R..3d 140 (B.C. Ct. App.); Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Canada, [1979]
107 D.L.R.3d 513 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div.); Lubicon Lake Band v. R., [1981] 117 D.L.R.3d 247
(Fed. Ct. Trial Div.), aff'd, [1981] 13 D.L.R.4th 159 (Fed. Ct. App.).
202. Calder, [1973] S.C.R. 313; Paulette, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 628.
203. Several sources suggest that Aboriginal people claimed title to the land even if
they were not bringing Aboriginal title claims in the courts. See, e.g., HARRING, supra note
3, at 38-39, 187; THE REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, supra
note 5, at 296.
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Chart 1 demonstrates that the number of cases in which a party claimed
Aboriginal title increased dramatically after 1982. Almost nine times as many
cases involving a claim of unextinguished Aboriginal title were filed and
adjudicated after 1982 as before.2' 4 While the greatest number of cases has been
204. Not all of these adjudications determined whether the claimant had Aboriginal
title as claimed. Several of the cases involved adjudication over a related issue and did not
decide the question of Aboriginal title.
The forty-four cases included in the data-set as involving an unextinguished
Aboriginal title claim are as follows: Gitanyow First Nation v. British Columbia (Minister
of Forests), No. L021243, 136 A.C.W.S. (3d) 396 (B.C.S.C. Dec. 30, 2004), available at
2004 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 9354; Homalco Indian Band v. Canada (Minister of Agriculture,
Food & Fisheries), No. L043154, 2005 BCSC 283 (B.C.S.C. Mar. 2, 2005), available at
2005 BC.C. LEXIS 409; New Brunswick (Minister of Nat'l Resources) v. McCoy, No.
75/04/CA, [2004] N.B.J. No. 201 (Ct. App. May 20, 2004), available at 2004 NB.C.
LEXIS 248; Walpole Island First Nation, Bkejwanong Territory v. Canada (Attorney
General), Nos. 00-CV-189329, 03-CV-261134CM1, 2004 A.C.W.S.J. 6197 (Ont. Super. Ct.
May 13, 2004), available at 2004 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 3340; Haida Nation v. British
Columbia, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511; Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia, [2004]
3 S.C.R. 550; British Columbia v. Okanagan Indian Band, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 371; Gitxsan
Houses v. British Columbia, [2003] 10 B.C.L.R.4th 126; R. v. Bernard, No. 12130113,
[20001 N.B.J. No. 138 (N.B. Prov. Ct. Apr. 13, 2000), available at 2000 CarswellNB 539,
aff'd, [2001] 239 N.B.R.2d 173 (N.B. Ct. Q.B.), rev'd, [2003] 262 N.B.R. (2d) 1 (N.B. Ct.
App.), rev'd, 2005 S.C.C. 43, 30005, [2005] S.C.J. No. 44 QUICKLAW (July 20, 2005);
Canadian W. Trust Co. v. Robson, No. 0203-0346-AC (Alta. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2002),
available at 2002 CarswellAlta 1242; Sterritt v. Prince Rupert (City), No. SC 4384
(B.C.S.C. Mar. 21, 2002), available at 2002 CarswellBC 749; Lax Kw'Alaams Indian Band
v. British Columbia (Minister of Sustainable Resource Management), [2002] 9 W.W.R. 173
(B.C. Ct. App.); Peerless Lake Indian Band v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs &
Northern Development), No. A-246-01 (Fed. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2002), available at 2002
CarswellNat 567; Desjarlais v. Canada, No. T-165-01 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div. Sept. 12, 2002),
available at 2002 CarswellNat 2493; Sun Peaks Resort Corp. v. Billy, No. S013235
(B.C.S.C. July 18, 2001), available at 2001 CarswellBC 1485; Soowahlie Indian Band v.
Canada (Attorney General), [2001] 209 D.L.R.4th 677 (Fed. Ct. App.); R. v. Marshall,
[2001] 191 N.S.R.2d 323 (N.S. Provincial Ct.), aff'd, No. S.H. 170568, 53 W.C.B. (2d) 132
(N.S. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2002), available at 2002 W.C.B.J. LEXIS 211, rev'd, No. CAC
178066, 59 W.C.B. (2d) 556 (N.S. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2003), available at 2003 W.C.B.J.
LEXIS 2084; Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada, [2001] 51 O.R.3d 641; Skeetchestn
Indian Band v. British Columbia, [2000] 80 B.C.L.R.3d 233 (B.C. Ct. App.); Westbank
First Nation v. British Columbia, [2000] 191 D.L.R.4th 180 (B.C.S.C.); Union of Nova
Scotia Indians v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), [1999] 180 N.S.R.2d 314 (N.S. Ct.
App.); Nemaiah Valley Indian Band v. Riverside Forest Products Ltd., Nos. 90 0913, 98
4847, 92 A.C.W.S. (3d) 729 (B.C.S.C. Nov. 2, 1999), available at 1999 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS
52364; Chemainus First Nation v. British Columbia Assets & Land Corp., No. 983940, 88
A.C.W.S. (3d) 520 (B.C.S.C. Jan. 7, 1999), available at 1999 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 48116;
Siska Indian Band v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), Nos. A981672, A992665
(B.C.S.C. Oct. 22, 1999), available at 1999 CarswellBC 2377; Ouj-Bougoumou Cree
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adjudicated since 1982, Chart 1 indicates that growth in Aboriginal title litigation
occurred after significant legal events. More Aboriginal title claims cases were
adjudicated after Calder in 1973 and after the Constitution Act, 1982. The most
dramatic increase in Aboriginal title claims adjudications, however, occurred after
the Supreme Court recognized Aboriginal title as a constitutionally protected right
in Delgamuukw in 1997.205 While the majority of these adjudications have
occurred in the lower courts, many of these cases are being appealed.2t 6 Six
Aboriginal title cases have made it onto the Supreme Court's agenda since
Nation v. Canada, No. T-3007-93, 176 FT.R. 307 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div. Dec. 1, 1999),
available at 1999 F.TR. LEXIS 1642; Sawridge Band v. Canada, No. T-66-86, 164 F.T.R.
95 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div. Jan. 20, 1999), available at 1999 F.T.R. LEXIS 641; Kitkatla Band
v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 56 B.C.L.R.3d 144 (B.C. Ct. App.); Kelly Lake
Cree Nation v. British Columbia (Ministry of Energy & Mines), A982279, A982280,
[1998] B.C.J. No. 2471 (B.C.S.C. Oct. 23, 1998), available at 1998 CarswellBC 2261;
Nunavik Inuit v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [1998] 164 D.L.R.4th 463 (Fed.
Ct. Trial Div.); R. v. Denault, No. 4380 (B.C. Provincial Ct. Jan. 29, 1998), available at
1998 CarswellBC 3041; Yale Indian Band v. Aitchelitz Indian Band, No. T-776-98, 151
F.T.R. 36 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div. June 24, 1998), available at 1998 F.T.R. LEXIS 1149;
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010; McKenzie c. Quebec (Procureur
grn6ral), No. 500-05-027983-962 (Que. Super. Ct. June 2, 1997), available at 1997
CarswellQue 771; Nanoose Indian Band v. British Columbia, No. V02523, 54 A.C.W.S.
(3d) 7 (B.C. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 1995), available at 1995 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 47232;
Newfoundland v. Ploughman, [19951 410 A.P.R. 84 (Nfld. Trial Div.); MacMillian v.
Simpson, No. C916306 (B.C.S.C. May 24, 1994), available at 1994 CarswellBC 2092;
James Smith Indian Band v. Saskatchewan (Master of Titles), [1995] 131 Sask. R. 60 (Ct.
App.); Ontario v. Bear Island Found., [1991] 2 S.C.R. 570; Tlowitsis-Mumtagila v.
MacMillan Bloedel Ltd., (B.C.S.C. Nov. 9, 1990), available at 1990 CarswellBC 1501; R.
v. Roche, [1990] 90 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 199 (Provincial Ct.); Cook v. Beckman, [1990] 84
Sask. R. 89 (Ct. App.); Grant v. British Columbia, No. CA007960 (B.C. Ct. App. June 27,
1990), available at 1989 CarswellBC 564; R. v. Ashini, [1989] 79 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 318 (Ct.
App.); MacMillian Bloedel Ltd. v. Mullin, [1985] 2 W.W.R. 722 (B.C.S.C.), rev'd, [1985]
61 B.C.L.R. 145 (Ct. App.).
205. See, e.g., Haida Nation, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511; Taku River Tlingit First Nation,
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 550; Okanagan Indian Band, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 371; Gitxsan Houses, [2003]
10 B.C.L.R.4th 126; Xeni Gwet'in First Nations v. Riverside Forest Prods. Ltd., [2002] 10
W.W.R. 486 (B.C.S.C.); Marshall, [2001] 191 N.S.R.2d 323; Chippewas of Sarnia Band,
[20011 51 O.R.3d 641; Skeetchestn Indian Band [2000] 80 B.C.L.R.3d 233; Westbank First
Nation, [2001] 191 D.L.R.4th 180; Nunavik Inuit, [1998] 164 D.L.R.4th 463; Denault,
1998 CarswellBC 3041.
206. See, e.g., Haida Nation, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511; Taku River Tlingit First Nation,
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 550; Okanagan Indian Band, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 371; Delagamuukw, [1997] 3
S.C.R. 1010; Gitxsan Houses, [2003] 10 B.C.L.R.4th 126; Chippewas of Sarnia Band,
[2001] 51 O.R.3d 64 1; Westbank First Nation, [2001] 191 D.L.R.4th 180; Chetnainus First
Nation, 1999 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 48116.
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1982.2"7 There has not only been a general increase in Aboriginal title claims, but
as Chart 2 shows, the number of Aboriginal title claims heard by the Supreme
Court of Canada has tripled since 1982.
Chart 2: Supreme Court Aboriginal Title
Litigation in Canada, 1962-2005
6
6
C4)
C-)
0
.0 2
E 2
z
0
1962-1982 1983-2005
Year Range
Since section 35 was added to the Constitution in 1982, the number of
cases filed and adjudicated has increased at both the trial and appellate level. The
greatest increase in the number of cases occurred after the Supreme Court of
Canada recognized Aboriginal title as a constitutionally protected right in 1997.
These increases suggest that Aboriginal title claimants have had the option of
using section 35 in making Aboriginal title claims since 1982 and that they have
been more inclined to make Aboriginal title claims since 1997.
IV. HOW TO UNDERSTAND THESE CHANGES AND THEIR
RELATION TO THE CONSTITUTION: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
OF THE POSSIBLE SOURCES OF LEGAL CHANGE
As Parts II and III demonstrate, Aboriginal title doctrine and litigation
have changed since 1982. This Part attempts to understand these changes by
207. Bernard, [2005] S.C.C. 43; Haida Nation, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511; Taku River
Tlingit First Nation, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550; Okanagan Indian Band, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 371;
Delagamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010; Bear Island Found., [1991] 2 S.C.R. 570.
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exploring several possible sources of legal change, including the constitutional
recognition of Aboriginal rights, changes in the composition of the Supreme Court
of Canada, and the development of legal support networks. Instead of
constructing a straightforward causal model to explain these changes, it concludes
that they can best be understood as part of sustained interactions among several
influences, including section 35.
A. A Traditional Legal Inquiry: Doctrinal Explanations of Constitutional
Chanae
Part IV.A evaluates the similarities and differences among the pre- and
post-1982 cases to determine if constitutional recognition has had a measurable
effect on the changes in Aboriginal title litigation. It measures the influence of
section 35(1) by looking at the sources relied on by the claimants, as well as the
sources cited by the justices of the Canadian Supreme Court as underlying their
decisions. This Part then compares the use of these sources to see if the claimants
and the Court relied on one more than the others. This analysis indicates that an
understanding of the Canadian Supreme Court's complex and often interrelated
use of sources explains the changes to Aboriginal title doctrine since 1982. It
suggests that section 35(1) influences Aboriginal title litigation because both
Aboriginal title claimants and the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada rely on
section 35(1) in Aboriginal title claims cases.
To determine whether section 35 has influenced Aboriginal title litigation
since 1982, it is important to look at whether more Aboriginal title claims are
being brought and whether claimants are basing their claims on section 35. As
discussed in Part III, Aboriginal title claims have increased since 1982. The
number of Aboriginal title claims rose most dramatically not after the Calder
decision, but after Delgamuukw. °8 The increase after Delgamuukw but not Calder
indicates that uncertainty remained about whether common law Aboriginal title
claims were cognizable after Calder. It also suggests that Aboriginal title claims
are now clearly cognizable and can be proven in Canadian courts. Aboriginal title
claimants may feel that they have stronger Aboriginal title claims now that they
know what kind of proof is required and that Aboriginal title is a constitutionally
protected right. The constitutional recognition of Aboriginal title in Delgamuukw
appears to have encouraged Aboriginal peoples to bring Aboriginal title claims.2°
208. See supra Part I1.
209. Not enough time has passed to determine the impact of the Court's most recent
Aboriginal title decision in Bernard. It appears to make it harder for nomadic and semi-
nomadic Aboriginal peoples to prove their title claims, Bernard, [2005] S.C.C. 43, 126
(LeBel, J., concurring), and accordingly, may decrease the number of Aboriginal title
claims made. At the same time, the Bernard decision provides greater clarity on how
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In making these Aboriginal title claims, Aboriginal peoples are
increasingly raising their claims under section 35(1). A preliminary analysis of
the cases adjudicated since 1982 indicates that claimants have increasingly based
Aboriginal title claims on section 35(1) of the Canadian Constitution or have had
their Aboriginal title claims treated as constitutional claims by Canadian courts.21 °
Of the forty-four cases adjudicated after 1982, thirty-four cases involve some
discussion of section 35 or section 35 cases."' In twenty-two of those cases, the
parties appear to be making a constitutional claim to Aboriginal title.212
A shift occurred between the late 1960s and the early 1990s as claimants
moved away from making claims based on the Land Titles Act. In the late 1960s
and early 1970s, Aboriginal title claims were brought under the Land Titles Act as
Aboriginal peoples sought to encumber land titles by asserting Aboriginal title
claims. 213 Since the mid-1990s, claimants have increasingly relied on the common
law and section 35(1) of the Constitution instead of the Land Titles Act in making
Aboriginal title claims.21 4 This increased use of section 35 by Aboriginal title
Aboriginal title claims may be proven, and this could encourage Aboriginal peoples
deadlocked in negotiations with the Crown to litigate their rights instead.
210. While this article notes the increased use of section 35 by Aboriginal title
claimants, it has not attempted to infer anything about the meaning of this use. For an
analysis of the meaning of the increased use of section 35, see Lee Maracle, The Operation
was Successful, But the Patient Died, in Box OF TREASURES OR EMPTY Box? TWENTY
YEARS OF SECTION 35, at 308 (Ardith Walker & Halie Bruce eds., 2003).
211. If the court's decision mentioned section 35 or section 35 cases, the author coded
the case as discussing section 35.
212. In some cases, it was difficult to determine the basis, if any, of the Aboriginal title
claim. The author coded a case as a constitutional claim if it appeared that the claimant or
the court treated it as such or if the claimant had been previously involved in negotiations
with the government. If it was unclear what the basis of the claim was or the claimant was
clearly relying on some other legal basis for its claim, the author did not code the case as a
section 35 claim.
213. See, e.g., Paulette v. The Queen, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 628; Cook v. Beckman, [19901
84 Sask. R. 89 (Ct. App.); James Smith Indian Band v. Saskatchewan (Master of Titles),
[1995] 131 Sask. R. 60 (Ct. App.); Skeetchestn Indian Band v. British Columbia, [2000] 80
B.C.L.R.3d 233 (B.C. Ct. App.).
214. See, e.g., Gitxsan Houses v. British Columbia, [2003] 10 B.C.L.R.4th 126; Xeni
Gwet'in First Nations v. Riverside Forest Prods. Ltd., [2002] 10 W.W.R. 486 (B.C.S.C.);
Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia, [2002] 98 B.C.L.R.3d at 16; R. v.
Marshall, [2001] 191 N.S.R.2d 323 (N.S. Provincial Ct.), affid, No. S.H. 170568, 53
W.C.B. (2d) 132 (N.S. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2002), available at 2002 W.C.B.J. LEXIS 211,
rev'd, No. CAC 178066, 59 W.C.B. (2d) 556 (N.S. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2003), available at
2003 W.C.B.J. LEXIS 2084; Chippewas of Samia Band v. Canada, [2001] 51 O.R.3d 641;
Nunavik Inuit v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [1998] 164 D.L.R.4th 463 (Fed.
Ct. Trial Div.); Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [1998] 45
484 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law Vol. 22, No. 3
claimants appears to have been bolstered by the Canadian Supreme Court's
recognition and validation of section 35 in Aboriginal title cases like
Delgamuukw. Since 1997, only one Aboriginal title claimant has made an
argument based on land title registration, and that claimant also appealed to the
constitutional protection of Aboriginal title by citing Delgamuukw.21 5  This
evidence suggests that section 35 has created a tool for claimants to use in
pursuing Aboriginal title claims and that claimants have increasingly been making
greater use of it. Moreover, the lower court cases demonstrate that Aboriginal
title claimants are using section 35 both as plaintiffs bringing Aboriginal title
claims and as an affirmative defense to criminal charges." 6 This indicates that
Aboriginal peoples are using section 35 in several different ways. Since 1982, the
number of Aboriginal title claims has increased and progressively more
Aboriginal title claimants are relying on section 35. This suggests that section 35
has emerged as a viable basis for Aboriginal title claims.
Further, the cases suggest that Aboriginal title claimants have been
making constitutional claims for some time. While the claimants in Delgamuukw
did not originally raise a section 35 claim when they brought the case in 1984, the
trial judge allowed for, and the Supreme Court upheld, a de facto amendment of
their pleadings to include a section 35(1) claim for their Aboriginal title at trial
because of the constitutional Aboriginal rights jurisprudence that had developed
since the claim was originally filed.2" 7 The plaintiffs' reliance in Delgamuukw on
section 35 indicates that Aboriginal title claimants were making constitutional
arguments as soon as they appeared to be available and not legally frivolous." 8
Additionally, in Delgamuukw, both parties relied on section 35(l).2l9 This
suggests that all parties involved in Aboriginal title cases, and not just Aboriginal
peoples, may be relying increasingly on section 35.
As mentioned before, the data show that the use of section 35 by
Aboriginal parties has continued to increase since Delgamuukw. Significantly, the
Aboriginal peoples involved in the four Aboriginal title cases heard by the
Supreme Court since Delgamuukw have also used section 35 in making their
B.C.L.R.3d at 80 (Ct. App.); R. v. Denault, No. 4380 (B.C. Provincial Ct. Jan. 29, 1998),
available at 1998 CarswellBC 3041.
215. Skeetchestn Indian Band, [2000] 80 B.C.L.R.3d 233.
216. See, e.g., Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1026; British
Columbia v. Okanagan Indian Band, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 371, 380.
217. Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1062. The Delgamuukw claimants may not
have originally argued for Aboriginal title under section 35 because when the Constitution
Act, 1982 was enacted, it was not clear that Aboriginal rights were enforceable rights.
218. Id.
219. See id. at 1026-29.
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claims.22° The data suggest that section 35 is playing a role in increased rates of
litigation and that Aboriginal peoples now see section 35 as a tool in making
Aboriginal title claims.
Another indicator of the influence of section 35 on Aboriginal title
litigation is whether the Canadian courts are relying on section 35 in deciding
Aboriginal title cases. As mentioned earlier, courts have discussed section 35 or
section 35 cases in thirty-four of the forty-four Aboriginal title cases adjudicated
since 1982. This evidence shows that courts, possibly even more than claimants,
have been inclined to use section 35 in hearing Aboriginal title cases and that
Canadian courts are increasingly treating Aboriginal title claims as constitutional
cases. This indicates that section 35 has also created a tool for courts to use in
hearing Aboriginal title cases.
The fact that section 35 has created a tool for courts to use is supported by the
Supreme Court of Canada's Aboriginal title jurisprudence since 1982. The
Canadian Supreme Court has relied heavily on section 35(1) and its earlier
precedents interpreting section 35(1) in Aboriginal title cases since 1982. The
Court has used section 35(1) or its section 35(1) precedent's jurisprudence in
explaining its reasons for decision in four of the six post-1982 Aboriginal title
cases involving an Aboriginal title claim: Delgamuukw, Bernard, Haida Nation,
and Taku River.
In the majority opinion in Delgamuukw, then Chief Justice Lamer found
section 35(1) to be central to his analysis of the issues in the case. First, the
majority opinion relied on section 35(1) in explaining the test it established for
proof of Aboriginal title.221  Lamer also cited section 35(1) and the Court's
previous constitutional analysis under section 35(1) in Van der Peet as the basis
for his decision that the evidentiary standards that apply in Aboriginal rights
claims, and particularly Aboriginal title claims cases, are distinct from traditional
rules of evidence.222 Finally, he relied on section 35(1) and the Court's previous
interpretations of that section in R. v. Sparrow and R. v. Gladstone in developing
the justificatory test for the infringement of Aboriginal title by provincial and
223ThCorfederal governments. The Court noted that constitutional recognition and
protection of Aboriginal title placed specific constraints on what the federal and
provincial governments could do to infringe the right. 2 4 The Supreme Court's
220. R. v. Bernard, 2005 S.C.C. 43, 30005, [2005] S.C.J. No. 44 QUICKLAW, V 38-
39 (July 20, 2005); Haida Nation v. British Columbia, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, 20; Taku
River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550, 24; Okanagan Indian
Band, [2003] 3 S.C.R. at 380-81. In Okanagan Indian Band, the defendants made a
constitutional claim in asserting Aboriginal title. [2003] 3 S.C.R. at 380-81. They did not
argue that their claim to interim funding was a constitutional claim. See id.
221. Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1107.
222. Id. at 1065-67, 1079.
223. Id. at 1107.
224. Id. at 1107-08.
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reliance on section 35 indicates that the constitutional incorporation of Aboriginal
rights is affecting Aboriginal title litigation.
The Court also based its clarification of the test for the proof of
Aboriginal title in Bernard on section 35 and its earlier section 35 precedents. In
Bernard, the Court began its decision by reiterating the importance of section 35
to its analysis of the common law right of Aboriginal title.225 It specifically cited
Delgamuukw as defining the tests for Aboriginal title claims based on exclusive
occupation at the time of British sovereignty. 226 The Court in Bernard admitted
that it was clarifying the tests established in Delgamuukw 27 It relied on section
35 cases in clarifying the process of reconciling Aboriginal perspectives and the
European common law in proving Aboriginal title claims.22 ' The Court explained,
"[Delgamuukw] requires that in analyzing a claim for aboriginal title, the Court
must consider both the aboriginal perspective and the common law
perspective. ' 229 The Court also used section 35 cases to refine the concepts of
occupation230 and exclusivity, 3 to define the distinction between Aboriginal title
and other Aboriginal rights,232 and to explain when oral histories can be used in
proving Aboriginal title claims.
2 13
A comparison of the Court's reliance on section 35 with its reliance on
other legal sources demonstrates how much influence section 35 has had on
Aboriginal title litigation. In addition to citing section 35 and its progeny heavily,
the Court in Delgamuukw and Bernard cited to other sources as bases for its
decisions. Most common among these other sources were the common law2 34 and
225. Bernard, [2005] S.C.C. 43, 9 38-39.
226. Id. 40.
227. Id.
228. Id. 49.
229. Id. 46.
230. Id. 56 (citing Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1100-01
149).
231. Bernard, [2005] S.C.C. 43, 57 (citing Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1104
155).
232. Id. 58-59 (citing R. v. Vanderpeet, 137 D.L.R.4th 289 (Can. 1996); R. v. Nikal,
[1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013; R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101; R. v. C6t6, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139;
and Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1106-07 1 159).
233. Id. 168 (citing Mitchell v. Minister of Nat'l Revenue, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911).
234. By common law, this article refers to common law cases either unrelated to
section 35 or decided prior to the incorporation of section 35 in 1982. The Supreme Court
is developing a constitutional common law related to section 35. The author coded this as
part of the impact of section 35 rather than as part of the development of the common law
because this constitutional common law could not exist independent of section 35, and it
largely revises the common law of Aboriginal title to account for the new constitutional
status of the common law right of Aboriginal title.
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law review articles on Aboriginal title.235 The Court often used law review articles
and books to shed light on its section 35 analysis, 236 but less often than it relied on
either section 35 or the common law.
While some scholars have suggested that constitutional changes reflect
the evolution of the common law more than actual changes in the text of the
Constitution,"' a comparison of how the Court has used the common law and
section 35 and how it has seen the relationship between the two does not
completely support that argument. Instead, a look at the Court's use of these
sources in Delgamuukw and Bernard indicates that courts rely in complex ways
on both the common law and constitutional texts in devising their jurisprudence
after constitutional reforms. Further, the analysis suggests that the Supreme Court
of Canada has been using section 35(1) to modify and revise the common law of
Aboriginal title in significant ways.
As noted above, the Court in Delgamuukw and Bernard relied heavily on
both section 35(1) and the common law. The Court often used section 35(1) to
revise the common law to take into consideration the new constitutional status of
Aboriginal title. Nonexclusive Aboriginal title had some undefined recognition
and protection under the common law prior to constitutional incorporation of the
right.238 As the Court acknowledged in Delgamuukw, the content, scope, and
nature of Aboriginal title had not been expressly defined under the common law
235. The author also looked for citations to international law, the laws of other
common law countries, and statutes. The author found few, if any, citations to these
sources in Bernard and Delgamuukw. These sources were cited more in other cases, such
as Okanagan Indian Band, which did not rely on section 35.
236. See, e.g., Bernard, [2005] S.C.C. 43, 57 [citing Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R.
at 1104-05 156 (citing KENT McNEIL, COMMON LAW ABORIGINAL TITLE 204 (1989))].
237. Constitutional law scholar David Strauss has suggested that constitutional texts
play at most a small role in constitutional interpretation and development. Strauss,
Common Law, supra note 10, at 877. He argues that evolving understandings of what the
Constitution requires - what he calls the constitutional common law - have a more
important influence on constitutional interpretation. Id. He contends that "[w]hatever
guidance the text of the Constitution (or any other text) gives, it gives because of a
complicated set of background understandings shared in the culture (both the legal culture
and the popular culture)." Id. at 911. In cases where the text of the constitution is not
precise, such as with section 35(1), which is written in broad terms, it "serves to limit the
range of disagreement" but does little else. Id. at 912. Strauss suggests that "[tihe text
matters most for the least important questions." Id. at 916. While the author agrees with
Strauss that many factors play a role in constitutional development, she thinks that courts
and litigants rely on constitutional texts more than he suggests and that courts use
constitutional provisions to revise the common law more than he admits. For other
critiques of Strauss, see Vermuele, supra note 19.
238. See, e.g., St. Catherine's Milling & Lumber Co. v. The Queen, [1888] 14 App.
Cas. 46, 54-55 (P.C.); Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313,
376 (Hall, J., dissenting).
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even though earlier precedent had suggested that Aboriginal title was not equal to
fee simple absolute under the common law of property.239 The Court largely
defined the content, scope, and nature of Aboriginal title under the common
law.24° It relied entirely on the common law in defining the right and then
recognized that section 35(1) incorporates the common law right."'
239. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1080-82.
240. McNEIL, EMERGING JUSTICE?, supra note 102, at 296.
241. [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1080-82. In defining Aboriginal title under the common law
in Delgamuukw, several scholars contend that the Court departed from the common law of
property. McNEIL, EMERGING JUSTICE?, supra note 102, at 296; Brian Donovan, Common
Law Origins of Aboriginal Entitlements to Land, 29 MAN. L. J. 289, 336-37 (2003)
[hereinafter Donovan, Common Law Origins]. The Court distinguished Aboriginal title
from other common law property rights by finding that it was a communal rather than an
individual right. Under Anglo-Canadian law generally, property rights must be vested in an
individual. MCNEIL, EMERGING JUSTICE?, supra note 102, at 298-99. The Court also found
that Aboriginal title was less than a fee simple absolute. Usually prior occupation under the
common law indicated that the possessor had fee simple unless another prior occupier
could show that he had better title. Donovan, Common Law Origins, supra, at 309-11, 314-
17.
These scholars also note that the Court remained consistent with the common law in
several respects. See, e.g., MCNEIL, EMERGING JUSTICE?, supra note 102, at 106-07. As
with other common law property rights, the Court found that prior occupation was proof of
title, id. at 106, that Aboriginal law could also be used to prove title, id., that the executive
had no power to abrogate the right, id., and that the content of the right was not limited to
traditional uses, id. at 112.
These departures from the common law of property appear related not to the
constitutional nature of Aboriginal title, but to the Court's earlier precedent on Aboriginal
title and definition of the right under the common law. Even before constitutional
incorporation, Aboriginal title did not receive the same protections under the common law
as other property rights. McNeil, Extinguishment, supra note 173, at 311; Donovan,
Common Law Origins, supra, at 340. While many scholars contend that Aboriginal title
should have received more protection under the common law than it currently receives,
they all note that the departure from the common law of property occurred in St.
Catherine's Milling and not after the constitutional recognition of Aboriginal fights in
1982. McNeil, Extinguishment, supra note 173, at 311; Donovan, Common Law Origins,
supra, at 340.
Brian Donovan has suggested that the closest the Court has come to an interpretation
of Aboriginal title equal to property rights under the common law was in Calder. Brian
Donovan, The Evolution and Present Status of Common Law Aboriginal Title in Canada:
The Law's Crooked Path and the Hollow Promise in Delgamuukw, 35 U.B.C. L. REv. 43,
60-62 (2001). If the Court had followed the common law of property like the dissent
indicated it might in Calder, Aboriginal title doctrine may have developed more
consistently with common law property rights. The Court's divergence from common law
property fights in Delgamuukw, however, relates to how it sees the common law evolving
now post-Calder. It can only be attributed to section 35 to the extent that section 35
recognizes "existing" Aboriginal rights. The word "existing" in section 35 suggests that
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The Court relied more heavily on section 35 in defining the constitutional
protection of Aboriginal title and establishing the tests for proof and infringement
of Aboriginal title in Delgamuukw. The Court modified the common law by
establishing procedural mechanisms to ensure protection of the common law right
of Aboriginal title consistent with its new constitutional status under section 35(1).
While the Court noted that the common law was also relevant to the development
of these procedures, it focused more on how the constitutional recognition of
Aboriginal title dictated its inquiries.242 The Court in Delgamuukw differentiated
constitutional incorporation from mere recognition of common law rights by
explaining that constitutional rights receive different protections than common
law rights. 243 It then explored this distinction in discussing how Aboriginal title is
to be treated now that it is a constitutionally protected right. The Court departed
from its earlier precedents, under which Aboriginal title was extinguishable by
provincial and federal governments. 244 It held first that post-1982 Aboriginal title
cannot be extinguished and then established constraints on infringements of it.
This indicates that section 35 played a key role in the Court's interpretation of
how Aboriginal title is to be treated as a constitutionally protected right and saw
the Constitution as playing a role in how it should determine when and how the
right can be infringed. It also shows how the Court interpreted section 35 to
revise the common law protections accorded to Aboriginal title and developed
the Court had to rely primarily, if not exclusively, on the common law in defining the
nature, scope, and content of Aboriginal title. While the Court may have been able to do
something entirely different if section 35 recognized all Aboriginal rights and not just
"existing" ones, this is not the argument made by these scholars. Rather, they contend that
the Court could have done something entirely different under the common law. Thus,
while it is impossible to determine how the common law would have evolved in any other
set of circumstances, it is unlikely that the Court would have interpreted Aboriginal title
under the common law in any other way. Further, based on Supreme Court precedents
dealing with Aboriginal title other than Calder, very little suggests that the Court was
prepared to define Aboriginal title like other common law property rights, such as a fee
simple absolute.
242. See, e.g., Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1107.
243. Id.
244. Kent McNeil argues that the Court departed from the common law of property by
creating a justificatory test that makes it easier to infringe on Aboriginal title, a
constitutionally protected property right, than on other property rights under the common
law expropriation of land doctrine. McNEIL, EMERGING JUSTICE?, supra note 102, at 308.
In making this argument, McNeil assumes that Aboriginal title should have received either
the same protections under the common law as other property rights or that constitutional
protection of Aboriginal rights should afford more protection than the common law does.
While intuitively his argument makes sense, the question here has to be which common law
- the common law of property or the common law of Aboriginal title? The Supreme Court
of Canada has treated Aboriginal title as distinct from other common law property rights
and has created a separate common law of Aboriginal title, from which it refuses to depart.
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new procedural mechanisms for protecting the now constitutionally recognized
common law right.
The Court dealt with the interrelationships between the common law and
section 35 in more complex ways in refining the test for proof of Aboriginal title
in Bernard. The Court's use of section 35 in relation to the common law in
Bernard further illustrates how section 35 modifies and incorporates the common
law. In Bernard, the Court acknowledged the importance of both the common
law of property and Aboriginal perspectives as required by section 35.245 While
the concurrence criticized the Court's majority for over-focusing on the common
law and ignoring the crucial role that Aboriginal perspectives should play in the
proof of Aboriginal title claims,2" the majority stated (at least rhetorically) that
Aboriginal perspectives inform the test for proof of Aboriginal title.247 The
Court's reaffirmation of the important role that Aboriginal perspectives play in
proving Aboriginal title claims shows that it has significantly revised the common
law, under which Aboriginal perspectives may not have been considered, because
of section 35. The Court then alternated between its reliance on both section 35
cases and the common law in clarifying the test for proof of Aboriginal title. The
Court's combined use of the two sources was most apparent (and complex) when
it cited to section 35 cases to support common law (of property) propositions.24 s
In doing so, the Court indicated that section 35, in addition to the common law,
informs the test for proof of Aboriginal title claims, and that section 35 alters the
common law to incorporate the constitutional status of Aboriginal title as a
common law right.
The Court's reliance on section 35 in its discussion in Delgamuukw and
Bernard of how Aboriginal title can be proven demonstrated that the Constitution
influenced Aboriginal title litigation. The Court revised the common law to allow
for the introduction of oral histories and Aboriginal perspectives because it
determined that this was required to achieve the reconciliatory purpose of section
245. R. v. Bernard, 2005 S.C.C. 43, 30005, [2005] S.C.J. No. 44 QUICKLAW, 44-
48 (July 20, 2005).
246. Id. 126 (LeBel, J., concurring).
247. The dissent made a very cogent point about how the majority treated Aboriginal
perspectives in clarifying the test for proof of Aboriginal title. See supra Part II. The
majority's decision in Bernard can be read to indicate that Aboriginal perspectives, while
mandated to be considered by section 35, play a much smaller and lesser role in the proof
of Aboriginal title claims than originally suggested by the Court in Delgamuukw. Having
said that, the author takes the Court at its word in that it clearly asserts that section 35
requires that Aboriginal perspectives be considered.
Even if the Court has lessened the role that Aboriginal perspectives play in the test
for proving Aboriginal title claims, this does not undermine the fact that the Court is relying
on section 35 at least rhetorically in Bernard. If nothing else, the Court's continued use of
section 35 and section 35 cases in Bernard suggests that section 35 has tremendous
symbolic value in Aboriginal rights cases.
248. See Bernard, [2005] S.C.C. 43, 54.
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35.249 The Court defined the criteria under its test for proof of Aboriginal title to
support this purpose. 5 Without section 35, it is not clear what the standards of
proof for Aboriginal title would have been, as the common law (of Aboriginal
title) had not developed any standards. Under the common law, Aboriginal
perspectives may not have been considered in the proof of Aboriginal title.
Instead, the Court's heavy reliance on section 35 in both Delgamuukw and
Bernard suggests that without section 35 the test may have been different.
While the standards may have evolved in the same way under the
common law due to its acceptance of legal pluralism in property cases," this is
not clear given the proscription against the use of oral histories as hearsay
evidence under the common law. The question for the court would be which
common law to follow - the common law of property, which accepted legal
pluralism and evidence of assertions of control over land,252 or the common law of
evidence, which heavily proscribes the use of hearsay evidence in courts of law.
Although several scholars suggest that under the common law of property the
Court would have reached the same or a better result as it did in Delgamuukw,2 s3
these scholars do not consider competing common law precedents that the Court
may have followed, including the common law of Aboriginal title and common
law rules of evidence. They overlook how the Court viewed the common law of
evidence in Delgamuukw."M In Delgamuukw, the Court indicated that it was
altering the common law of evidence by allowing for the admission of oral
histories in Aboriginal title cases and that section 35 required this departure.255
249. Id. 46.
250. Id. 52.
251. Donovan, Common Law Origins, supra note 241, at 296-98.
252. Id.
253. See id. at 291; McNEIL, EMERGING JUSTICE?, supra note 102, at 296-97.
254. Then Chief Justice Lamer suggested in Delgamuukw that under the common law
rules of evidence oral histories would not be admissible in Aboriginal title cases. He
explained, "Many features of oral histories would count against both their admissibility and
their weight as evidence of prior events in a court that took a traditional approach to the
rules of evidence." Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1068. In particular, he noted the
potential hearsay problem:
Another feature of oral histories which creates difficulty is that they
largely consist of out-of-court statements, passed on through an unbro-
ken chain across the generations of a particular aboriginal nation to the
present-day. These out-of-court statements are admitted for their truth
and therefore conflict with the general rule against the admissibility of
hearsay.
Id. at 1069.
255. Id.
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This indicates that if the Court had followed the common law of evidence, which
was clearly an option, its decision may have been dramatically different.
The Court has justified many of its departures from the common law as
required by section 35. The constitutional incorporation of Aboriginal rights
consequently provided the Court with a basis separate from and in addition to the
common law for its decision in Delgamuukw. The Court has used section 35 to
modify and revise the common law to account for the constitutional status of
Aboriginal title and to develop procedural mechanisms consistent with that status.
While the Court may have departed from the common law anyway because, under
the evolutionary nature of the common law, precedents can be discarded when
they are no longer relevant,"' it is not clear that the Court would have done this,
or would have done it in this way, without section 35.
Further, while courts may have developed the common law to recognize
and protect Aboriginal title and rights in the same way that it has evolved under
section 35, it is not clear how long it would have taken for that process to occur.
As Part III illustrates, the Court does not take very many Aboriginal title cases,
and over thirty years passed between Calder and Delgamuukw. If nothing else,
section 35 prompted the Court to address questions of Aboriginal title and
encouraged it to develop Aboriginal title doctrine sooner rather than later.
While the Court's dual reliance on the common law and the Constitution
suggests that it was influenced by both, its heavy use of section 35 in its creation
of tests for proof and infringement of Aboriginal title suggests that section 35 is
playing a large role in its decision-making. Further, the Court has indicated that it
is using section 35 to revise the common law in accordance with the constitutional
recognition of Aboriginal title. The Court has made it clear that the constitutional
recognition of Aboriginal title matters in at least two ways. First, section 35
prohibits the extinguishment of Aboriginal title after 1982 and necessitates that
any infringement of the right mandates substantial justification. If substantial
justification of the infringement cannot be shown, then the statute or regulation
may be declared unconstitutional. Second, section 35 requires that courts consider
Aboriginal perspectives in determining whether Aboriginal title exists. This
indicates that the constitutional incorporation of Aboriginal rights has been a
significant influence in the Court's adjudication of Aboriginal title claims. The
Court's reliance on both the common law and section 35, however, suggests that
the best explanation for the Court's development of Aboriginal title doctrine since
1982 is a complex and interrelated reading of the common law and section 35.257
The Court has also relied heavily on section 35 in two of the other four
cases that it has heard since 1982. Although the Court mentioned its growing
256. Donovan, Common Law Origins, supra note 241, at 312-13.
257. This reading may also explain why the Court did not go further in its Aboriginal
title jurisprudence and depart from the common law entirely. The Court had to rely on both
the common law and section 35 because, to some extent, the term "existing" in section 35
mandated that the Court define the right under the common law.
Does Constitutional Change Matter?
section 35 jurisprudence in Ontario v. Bear Island Foundation and British
Columbia v. Okanagan Indian Band, it did not rely on section 35 in its reasons for
the decisions in those cases.2 58  Neither case appears to have been brought
pursuant to section 35, and the Court in Okanagan Indian Band expressly stated
that the "issue of a constitutional right to funding d[id] not arise."25
The Court relied heavily on section 35 in its reasons for decision in
Haida Nation and Taku River.26° In Haida Nation, the Court explicitly found in
section 35 of the Constitution the Crown's duty to consult and accommodate
Aboriginal peoples when making decisions that may adversely impact unproven
Aboriginal title and rights claims. 261 It found that section 35 protects the potential
rights embedded in the claims, 262 and that a duty to consult and accommodate is
essential to maintaining the honor of the Crown in the reconciliation process
mandated by section 35.263 The Court also relied on section 35 in its
determination that the law of injunctions did not exclusively govern the
264situation. Similarly, in Taku River, the Court rejected the Province's argument
that the common law duty of fair dealing did not extend to the facts at hand and
re-emphasized the importance of the Crown's duty to consult under section 35.265
In the majority of its post-constitutional Aboriginal title cases involving
Aboriginal title claims, the Court has relied heavily upon section 35 to justify its
reasons for decision. This indicates that section 35 has influenced and continues
to influence Aboriginal title litigation. That influence, however, does not fully
explain the Court's development of Aboriginal title doctrine since 1982. To fully
comprehend the changes in Aboriginal title doctrine, it is essential to consider the
complex interrelationship between the Court's reliance on section 35 and other
sources, including the common law.
258. Ontario v. Bear Island Found., [1991] 2 S.C.R. 570, 575; British Columbia v.
Okanagan Indian Band, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 371, 387.
259. Okanagan Indian Band, [2003] 3 S.C.R. at 387.
260. In a simple counting of the sources relied upon by the Court in these cases, the
author found that the Court cited section 35 and section 35 cases more than any other
individual source.
261. [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, 120.
262. Id. 25.
263. Id. 33 ("To limit reconciliation to the post-proof sphere risks treating
reconciliation as a distant legalistic goal, devoid of the 'meaningful content' mandated by
the 'solemn commitment' made by the Crown in recognizing and affirming aboriginal
rights and title.").
264. Id. ( 14-15.
265. Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550, IT 23-
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B. Law and Society: An Inquiry into Nondoctrinal Sources of Constitutional
Change
While the Court attributes its reasons for decision in most of its post-
1982 Aboriginal title cases to section 35, other factors may also play a role in its
decision-making and in the increased number of Aboriginal title claims being
adjudicated by the lower courts. Many scholars maintain that constitutional
provisions alone do not account for changes in constitutional norms or
litigation.2  Political scientist Charles Epp suggests that the constitutional text
alone does not explain the rights revolution in Canada. 267 He argues that changes
in the judiciary and the development of legal support networks also influence
Supreme Court agendas."6 Rates of litigation may increase if claimants think the
justices are more receptive to their claims or if legal support networks develop to
facilitate the bringing of these claims. Changes in legal doctrine may also be
related to changes in the judiciary and changes in the legal atmosphere.
This section considers some other possible factors that could be
influencing the changes to Aboriginal title litigation, including changes in the
Supreme Court of Canada and the development of legal support networks. To
gauge changes in the judiciary, it evaluates appointments and the judicial
predispositions (such as whether the justices on the Court are considered to be
more liberal or conservative over time) of justices of the Supreme Court of
Canada. It then measures the rise of legal support networks by looking at the
development of rights advocacy organizations and sources of funding. It argues
that while some changes in the judiciary have occurred and legal support networks
are slowly developing, these factors cannot completely account for the changes in
Aboriginal title litigation. It concludes that the recent changes in Aboriginal title
litigation are best understood as the result of both doctrinal and nondoctrinal
influences.
Changes in the personnel of the Supreme Court of Canada in the past
forty years may have had some influence on the changes in Aboriginal title
litigation. 269 The small number of Aboriginal title cases heard by the Court,
however, makes this very difficult to determine with any certainty. Generally, the
Canadian Supreme Court is considered to be much less politicized than the U.S.
266. See, e.g., Strauss, Irrelevance, supra note 19, at 1457, 1462-64 (suggesting that
constitutional provisions only make a difference when certain conditions are met); Siegel,
supra note 19, at 316-28 (noting that popular mobilization is a factor in changes in
constitutional norms and litigation).
267. Epp, supra note 56, at 156-57.
268. Id.
269. The author limits this analysis to the past forty years because until 1949, the
Privy Council, not the Supreme Court of Canada, had final say in Canadian cases. For this
reason, the Supreme Court was generally considered a weak and ineffectual body until the
mid- to late-twentieth century.
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Supreme Court270 and exactly what influence can be attributed to changes in court
personnel is unclear.
The composition of the Supreme Court of Canada has changed somewhat
in the thirty years since Calder. Relatively conservative justices, who were not
open to the recognition of civil liberties and civil rights claims, composed the
Canadian Supreme Court in the early 1970s when Calder was decided.27 Starting
in the mid-1980s, this began to shift, and by the early 1990s the Court had an
almost even mix of liberal and conservative justices. 2  This liberalization of the
Court may have had some impact on its decision-making in Aboriginal title
cases.
273
Another significant change in the Court's composition that could be
affecting Aboriginal title cases is the increase in the number of female justices.
The first woman, Justice Bertha Wilson, was appointed in 1982. Since then, the
Court has experienced an increasing number of female appointments. 274 Today,
the Court has four female justices, including the Right Honorable Beverly
McLachlin, who was appointed in 2000 to be the first Madam Chief Justice. If
differences exist in voting patterns by gender, then the increased number of
women on the Court may be affecting its decision-making in Aboriginal title
cases. 275
The mix of justices on the Court alone, however, does not influence its
decision-making. Unlike in the United States, where all nine justices of the
Supreme Court constitute a panel, in Canada, six justices often compose a panel.
270. Epp, supra note 56, at 165-67.
271. Id. at 167.
272. Id. at 169 tbl.9.1.
273. Generally, social scientists have found the appointment of justices by a
conservative or liberal Prime Minister largely irrelevant to how they vote. See, e.g., PETER
MCCORMICK, CANADA'S COURTS: A SOCIAL SCIENTIST'S GROUND-BREAKING ACCOUNT OF
THE CANADIAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM 90-91 (1994). While McCormick noticed that Liberal
appointees were slightly more likely to vote to reverse than Conservative ones, the effects
were "too limited to suggest a strong causal relationship." Id. at 90.
274. Since 1982, the following women have been appointed to the Canadian Supreme
Court: Hon. Beverly McLachlin (1989); Hon. Louise Arbour (1999); Hon. Marie
Deschamps (2002); Hon. Rosalie Silberman Abella (2004); and the Hon. Louise Charron
(2004). Canadian Supreme Court, About the Judges, http://www.scc-
csc.gc.ca/AboutCourt/judges/curformpuisne/index e.asp (last visited Nov. 7, 2005).
275. Several studies have attempted to determine whether gender makes a difference
on the Supreme Court of Canada. Generally, the studies found that whether gender matters
depends on the kind of case being adjudicated. Candace C. White, Gender Differences on
the Supreme Court, in LAW, POLITICS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN CANADA 85, 89-90
(Frederick L. Morton ed., 3d ed. 2002). This indicates that gender may make a difference
in Aboriginal rights cases, but the author knows of no studies that have looked specifically
at the role of gender in such cases.
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Thus, the composition of each individual panel may matter as much, if not more,
than the general composition of the Court.
While these changes in the Court's composition may have influenced
some of the judicial decision-making, they have not led to revolutionary changes
in the Supreme Court's agenda.276 The Court has had almost unfettered discretion
over when it grants a leave to appeal since 1975,277 and largely sets its own
agenda. Studies of the Court's agenda-setting practices suggest that it is less
politicized than the United States Supreme Court.278 Jurisprudential accounts,
which posit that legal considerations weigh heavily in justices' decisions to grant
review, offer the most persuasive explanations of Supreme Court decisions in
Canada.27 9 Despite changes in court personnel, until recently, the Court has not
found it necessary to place Aboriginal title claims on its agenda very often.280
Only in the past couple of years has the Court taken one or two Aboriginal title
cases every term, 28' and one case every term does not constitute a large part of the
Court's agenda. In general, Aboriginal rights cases (including Aboriginal title
cases) were not significant enough to merit their own category in the Supreme
Court's statistics of the cases it has granted leave of appeal in and heard since
1993.282 Nor have the Court's decisions in Aboriginal title cases indicated that it
276. The largest change in the Canadian Supreme Court's agenda has been a shift from
largely private law cases in the nineteenth century to public law cases. See MCCORMICK,
supra note 273, at 81-82. This change is attributed to the entrenchment of the Charter in
1982 and the Court's discretionary authority over its docket. Id. at 82-83. In his study of
the Canadian Supreme Court's practices of granting leave to appeal, Roy Flemming found
that ideological disagreements did not play a significant role in decisions to grant leave of
appeal. Roy B. FLEMMING, TOURNAMENT OF APPEALS: GRANTING JUDICIAL REVIEW IN
CANADA 82-83 (2004).
277. Epp, supra note 56, at 157. The Canadian Supreme Court does not have complete
discretion over its docket because it has to hear appeals as of right in some criminal cases
and reference questions put to it by the federal government or Governor-in-Council.
FLEMMING, supra note 276, at 6-7; MCCORMICK, supra note 273, at 76-77.
278. FLEMMING, supra note 276, at 99-100. The Canadian Supreme Court may be
perceived as less politicized in part because interest group participation through intervenor
(amicus curiae) briefs is strongly discouraged at the leave of appeal stage in Canada. Id. at
13. While the Court liberally grants intervenor status, intervenor involvement is limited
almost exclusively to the merits stage of the litigation. Id.
279. Id. at 99-100.
280. Epp, supra note 56, at 157.
281. The Supreme Court of Canada heard one case in 2003 (Okanagan Indian Band),
two companion cases in 2004 (Haida Nation and Taku River), and two consolidated cases
in 2005 (Bernard).
282. Supreme Court of Canada, Supreme Court Statistics 2004, Category 3: Appeals
Heard, Appeals Heard 2004: Type, http://www.scc-
csc.gc.ca/information/statistics/HTML/cat3_e.asp (last visited Nov. 7, 2005).
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is more receptive to upholding these claims.283 The trend towards more liberal and
more female Justices may influence the changes in Aboriginal title litigation, but
it does not appear to be a major force in these changes. Instead, the influence of
changes in the judiciary is best understood as part of the multiple influences
leading to the changes in Aboriginal title doctrine and litigation since 1982.
Another factor that could be influencing the changes in Aboriginal title
litigation is the development of legal support networks to facilitate litigation. To
determine whether legal support networks are developing to facilitate the litigation
of Aboriginal title claims, the development of two aspects of the legal community
needs to be evaluated: rights advocacy organizations and sources of funding.
284
National Aboriginal rights advocacy movements began developing prior
to constitutional change in 1982, and some actively worked for the constitutional
incorporation of section 35.285 Since 1982, however, many of these rights
283. The Court's decision in Bernard may be read to suggest the exact opposite,
namely that the Court is less likely to affirm Aboriginal title claims after 1982. The
Bernard decision is the second time since 1982 that the Court has rejected Aboriginal title
claims. See also Ontario v. Bear Island Found., [1991] 2 S.C.R. 570, 575. Prior to 1982,
the Court also dismissed two Aboriginal title claims. Calder v. Attorney-General of British
Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313, 345; Paulette v. The Queen, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 628, 645. To
date, the Court has never affirmed an Aboriginal title claim, so in a rough win-loss counting
of Aboriginal title cases before and after 1982, it looks like Aboriginal peoples fare no
better under section 35. A more complex analysis, however, suggests that Aboriginal
peoples have made small gains in pursuing their title claims since 1982, because now the
Crown cannot extinguish title, has to consult with Aboriginal peoples even before their
claims are proven, and may have to supply interim funds to Aboriginal peoples to try their
claims.
284. The relationship between social movements and legal change remains widely
debated. In the United States, several studies have attempted to determine the relationship
between courts and social change. See generally, GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW
HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS
AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994). The
findings of these studies remain largely indeterminate because of feedback effects between
courts and social change. While the majority of the literature focuses on the relationship
between social attitudes and doctrinal change, a few studies have attempted to look at the
impact of social movements on the rates of litigation rather than doctrinal change. See,
e.g., Epp, supra note 56, at 4-5.
Feedback effects exist in the causal relationship between social change and courts,
which is why constitutional changes are best explained as part of a larger sustained
dynamic between influences, rather than as part of a uni-directional causal trajectory. The
author contends that an evaluation of the success of social movements entails not only a
study of whether they successfully placed their issues on the constitutional agenda in 1982,
but also whether after 1982 they were able to ensure the enforcement of the rights
embodied in the Constitution of 1982.
285. Aboriginal rights advocacy organizations participated, albeit in a more minor role
than they would have liked, in the constitutional negotiations leading up to the Constitution
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advocacy organizations have focused on lobbying and legislative strategies for
change rather than litigation.286 The Assembly of First Nations (AFN), which
represents First Nations in all regions of Canada, describes itself as a lobbying
organization.287 AFN has played a limited role in Aboriginal rights litigation
generally. It filed intervenor's briefs in Bear Island Foundation and Bernard,288
but otherwise does not appear to be involved in Aboriginal title litigation.
Similarly, the national Inuit organization, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, has used a land
settlement negotiations strategy rather than litigation to resolve outstanding land
claims with the Canadian government.289 While section 35 may not have been
incorporated without their past efforts, neither of these national organizations
appear to have built legal support networks or invested significant resources in the
litigation of Aboriginal title claims.29°
Rights advocacy organizations supporting Mrtis2 9' and non-status and
off-reserve Indians have been more actively engaged in developing legal support
Act, 1982. See generally HAWKES, supra note 85, at 3-8. They were at least partially
successful in placing Aboriginal issues on the constitutional agenda in 1982, because
section 35 was incorporated into the Constitution Act, 1982.
286. See Assembly of First Nations National Indian Brotherhood, Assembly of First
Nations - The Story (2001), http://www.afn.ca/article.asp?id=59 (last visited Nov. 6, 2005).
287. Assembly of First Nations National Indian Brotherhood, Description of the AFN,
http://www.afn.ca/article.asp?id=58. (last visited Nov. 6, 2005). While the AFN does
provide information on residential schools litigation, its website does not highlight any
other Aboriginal litigation. See id.
288. Bear Island Found., [1991] 2 S.C.R. 570; R. v. Bernard, 2005 S.C.C. 43, 30005,
[2005] S.C.J. No. 44 QUICKLAW (July 20, 2005).
289. Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, ITK and Land Claims,
http://www.itk.ca/corporate/history-land-claims.php (last visited Nov. 6, 2005). This is
consistent with the approach of Inuit peoples generally. See JOHN J. BORROWS & LEONARD
I. ROTMAN, ABORIGINAL LEGAL ISSUES: CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 437-42 (2d
ed. 2003).
290. J.R. Miller suggests that a rare moment of Aboriginal unity led to the successful
incorporation of Aboriginal rights into the Constitution in 1982. J.R. MILLER,
SKYSCRAPERS HIDE THE HEAVENS: A HISTORY OF INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS IN CANADA 243
(1989). This unity largely dissipated during the struggles over the Constitution, id., and the
resulting disunity may explain in part their inability to obtain effective implementation of
section 35.
291. Mrtis are one of the three Aboriginal groups constitutionally protected by section
35. The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples referred to Mrtis as "distinct Aboriginal
peoples whose early ancestors were of mixed heritage (First Nations, or Inuit in the case of
the Labrador Mrtis, and European) and who associate themselves with a culture that is
distinctly M&is." REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM'N ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES VOL. 1 (1996),
available at http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/sg/sg le.html.
2005
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networks.292 Both the Congress of Aboriginal Peoples (CAP) and the Mdtis
National Council (MNC), the two main rights advocacy organizations serving
Mtis and non-status and off-reserve Indians, include information on recent
litigation on their websites.293 The CAP has also brought at least one lawsuit in
the federal courts, seeking the recognition of the rights of non-status Indians and
Mdtis under Constitution Act, 1867, section 91(24), as well as negotiations with
the Canadian government for violations of these rights.294 While this claim may
involve Aboriginal title at some point, it is not clear that they are claiming
Aboriginal title in litigation presently or supporting other Aboriginal title claims
brought by Mdtis and non-status Indians. The CAP did, however, intervene in
Bernard,295 which may indicate that they are taking a more active interest in
litigation. The MNC has also taken a more active approach. It has a two-part
Mdtis rights strategy, mixing litigation with negotiations, but admits that to date
only one Aboriginal title claim has been brought by Mdtis and it has not reached
the Supreme Court.296 The MNC, however, has been actively involved in other
litigation to recognize Mdtis rights, including the Powley297 case recently heard by
the Supreme Court of Canada. While CAP and MNC are slowly building legal
support networks to enforce their Aboriginal rights, they have not played a
significant role in Aboriginal title litigation to date.
Finally, an Indigenous Bar Association exists in Canada to promote the
development of indigenous law and indigenous lawyers. Although it is building a
network of indigenous lawyers, it does not appear to be engaged in funding or pro
bono work on Aboriginal title claims.29 s
While national Aboriginal rights advocacy groups do not include
Aboriginal title litigation as a key part of their agendas, at least one regional
Aboriginal rights advocacy group has. The Union of British Columbia Indian
Chiefs (UBCIC) has made the defense and protection of Aboriginal Title part of
292. It is not surprising that rights advocacy organizations for M~tis and non-status
and off-reserve Indians are more inclined to develop legal support networks because they
have been left out of many of the Canadian government's alternative negotiation and
settlement options, forcing them to litigate their Aboriginal rights claims. The legal status
of M6tis was unclear prior to R. v. Powley, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 207.
293. Congress of Aboriginal Peoples, Onsite Links to Legal and Case Law Info
http://www.abo-peoples.org/Legal/legal.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2005); Mt'TIs NAT'L
COUNCIL, MTIS CASE LAW: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS (2000), available at
http://www.metisnation.ca/rights/download/metis case law-summary_2000.pdf.
294. Plaintiff's Statement of Claim, Daniels v. the Queen, No. T-2172-99 (Fed. Ct.
Dec. 1999), available at http://www.abo-peoples.org/Legal/CAP91(24).html.
295. R. v. Bernard, 2005 S.C.C. 43, 30005, [2005] S.C.J. No. 44 QUICKLAW, (July
20, 2005).
296. MtTis NAT'L COUNCIL, supra note 293, at 13-14.
297. R. v. Powley, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 207.
298. See Indigenous Bar Association, What is the IBA?,
http://www.indigenousbar.ca/main-e.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2005).
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its mission.299 The UBCIC intervened in Taku River and actively promotes the
research of land claims.
300
While legal support networks in general have grown in Canada since the
late 1960s,"' few, if any, of these networks have focused specifically on
Aboriginal rights and Aboriginal title litigation. National Aboriginal rights
advocacy groups have focused their attention on negotiating with the government
rather than litigating their rights and have not actively created legal support
networks. 302 Thus, while these Aboriginal rights advocacy groups were somewhat
successful in achieving the constitutional incorporation of section 35 in 1982 and
amendments to it in 1983,303 they have not played as central a role in the
enforcement of section 35 rights as they might have by developing Aboriginal
legal support networks.
A second aspect of the legal community that may influence Aboriginal
title litigation is the availability of funding to support Aboriginal title claims. The
expense of litigation is a major roadblock to litigation in any context and the
bringing of Aboriginal rights litigation often depends on whether Aboriginal
peoples have the resources to pursue their claims. 3' An analysis of private and
public funding sources for Aboriginal title claims indicates that legal support
networks are not developing funding programs to support Aboriginal title claims.
Generally, private funding sources for Aboriginal title claims have been
slow to develop." 5  As previously discussed, Aboriginal rights advocacy
organizations are not designating resources towards these claims. Furthermore,
legal aid societies have not developed sections committed to Aboriginal rights
299. Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs, Our History,
http://ubcic.bc.ca/about/history.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2005).
300. The number of intervenors in Aboriginal title claims at the appellate level has
increased since Calder, but this may in part be because it has been easier to intervene since
1975. Aboriginal rights advocacy groups in general, however, have not been intervening in
Aboriginal title litigation. More commonly, the attorneys general of various provinces and
individual First Nations intervene in these cases.
301. EPP, supra note 56, at 180.
302. The author has not attempted to determine the impact that these negotiations may
be having on Aboriginal title doctrine and vice versa in this article but acknowledges the
possibility of such interactions.
303. In 1983, the Canadian Constitution was amended through the Constitution
Amendment Proclamation, 1983 to entrench recognition of rights obtained under
Aboriginal land claims agreements, to provide for gender equality, and to commit all
governments to invite Aboriginal and territorial government representatives to conferences
on issues relating to them. William F. Maton, Canadian Constitutional Documents: A Legal
History (2004), http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/Canada/English.
304. Ian Taylor, Financing Aboriginal Litigation, in ABORIGINAL RIGHTS LITIGATION,
supra note 87, at 348.
305. Id. at 350-60.
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litigation.3" 6 Nor have Aboriginal rights cases become part of the pro bono
agendas of major law firms, which tend to concentrate more on Aboriginal
business development. 7 Many of the legal support networks that have developed
fund individual rights issues, such as landlord-tenant relationships or claims under
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.30 8
Public sources of funding are more widely available, but remain limited,
as well. The government program most active in Aboriginal rights cases is the
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) Test Case Funding Program (TCFP).
This program started in 1965 to promote "the development of case law relating to
Indian issues. '3 °9 Initially, it only funded litigation concerning treaty rights,
Indian Act issues, and criminal murder cases.310 In 1983, the TCFP was re-
engineered into its current form311 and its scope was expanded to include
Aboriginal rights cases. While the program has funded several large Aboriginal
title cases, including Bear Island Foundation and Delgamuukw,"' it is tiny when
compared to the plethora of Aboriginal title claims percolating through the
Canadian legal system. Traditionally, it has had a budget of under $1 million
Canadian per year.313
Due to its limited resources, the TCFP is not advertised by INAC and it
only funds adjudication at the appellate level.314 All initial case research and trial
court costs have to be paid before Aboriginal rights litigants are even eligible for
the program. Furthermore, if a recipient of TCFP receives a judgment or award of
costs against the government of Canada in litigation or a sum from the
government in settlement of a claim, those amounts are to be set off against the
contribution received through the TCFP. 315 Thus, the program is very limited in
its scope and financial support of Aboriginal rights claims.
Despite these limits, at least one scholar has noted that there appears to
be a link between the cases funded by the TCFP and the cases taken on appeal by
the Canadian Supreme Court. This possible link indicates that INAC may play
306. Id. at 351.
307. Id. at 350.
308. Id. at 352-53. For instance, Aboriginal Legal Services Toronto assists individual
Aboriginal people, and the Court Challenges Program funds litigation relating to the
language and equality provisions in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
309. DEP'T OF INDIAN AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN DEV., LEGAL LIAISON AND SUPPORT
STUDY, TEST CASE FUNDING PROGRAM 5 (1988) [hereinafter LEGAL LIAISON AND SUPPORT
STUDY].
310. Id.
311. See id. at 3.
312. Taylor, supra note 304, at 355.
313. Through the late 1980s, the entire budget for the program was set at $300,000
Canadian per year. LEGAL LIAISON AND SUPPORT STUDY, supra note 309, at 15.
314. Id. at 11-12.
315. Id. at 14.
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some role in case selection and development, and thus, may influence the
development of Aboriginal rights doctrine. While the program has provided some
support for Aboriginal title claims, its limited resources alone cannot fully explain
the explosion in the number of Aboriginal title claims filed and adjudicated since
1982. More likely, INAC has used the program to influence the Supreme Court's
agenda and which cases develop the doctrine of Aboriginal title.
The absence of funding opportunities, however, has also influenced the
Court's Aboriginal title jurisprudence. Arguably, if adequate funding sources
existed, the Okanagan Indian Band would not have sued for interim litigation
expenses in British Columbia v. Okanagan Indian Band.316 In that case, the
Okanagan Indian Band argued that it was unable to find any governmental or pro
bono sources of aid to help support its Aboriginal title claim. 317 The Court found
the Band's argument persuasive and held that interim costs could be granted to a
party seeking recognition of its constitutional rights when the litigation would be
unable to proceed if the order were not made, the claim to be adjudicated was
prima facie meritorious, and the issues raised transcended the individual interests
of the particular litigant, were of public importance, and had not been resolved in
previous cases.318
While limited legal support networks have developed since the 1960s to
support Aboriginal title claims, these networks have not emerged to the same
degree as general legal support networks. Government programs and funding
sources have the largest influence on Aboriginal title litigation, and the limited
resources of these programs cannot fully explain the changes in Aboriginal title
litigation. It appears that the limited development of legal support networks has
had some influence on Aboriginal title litigation.
Multiple influences have contributed to the changes in Aboriginal title
litigation since 1982. These changes can therefore only be understood by
considering these multiple influences as part of a larger, interrelated social
dynamic. While section 35 is clearly not the only influence on these changes, it
has played an important role, at least symbolically, in Aboriginal title litigation
since 1982, as both parties and courts have used section 35 as a basis upon which
to justify Aboriginal title claims. Section 35's influence, however, cannot be fully
appreciated without acknowledging how it relates to the other factors influencing
these changes to Aboriginal title litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
Constitutional change suggests legal, social, and political change, yet the
practical effects of textual changes to constitutions are rarely empirically
316. [2003] 3 S.C.R. 371.
317. Id. at 405 (Major, J., dissenting).
318. Id. at 399-400.
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evaluated. Constitutional recognitions of Aboriginal peoples are thought to
positively impact Aboriginal peoples by increasing the legal recognition and
protection of their rights. But many unintended consequences may stem from the
constitutional recognition of Aboriginal rights, suggesting that constitutional
recognitions of rights may not fulfill the promises of doctrinal certainty attributed
to them. By evaluating some of these claims in terms of Aboriginal title litigation,
this article sheds some light on constitutionalism and whether constitutional rights
matter at all.
A comparison of Aboriginal title litigation before and after 1982
demonstrates that Aboriginal title litigation has changed in the last twenty years.
First, Aboriginal title doctrine changed substantially with the Supreme Court's
decisions in Delgamuukw, Bernard, Okanagan Indian Band, Haida Nation, and
Taku River. Second, the number of Aboriginal title claims since 1982 has
skyrocketed.
Several factors have influenced these changes in Aboriginal title
litigation. The evaluation of these factors suggests that the constitutional
recognition of Aboriginal rights has had a significant impact on Aboriginal title
litigation in the past twenty years. The Canadian Supreme Court and Aboriginal
title claimants' heavy reliance upon section 35(1) indicates that the Constitution
has at least symbolically influenced the development of Aboriginal title litigation
since 1982. The textual changes to the Canadian Constitution, however, do not
fully explain the changes to Aboriginal title litigation. Rather, these changes are
best explained as being part of sustained interactions among multiple influences,
including the common law, changes in court personnel, and the development of
legal support networks over time.
